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A B ST R AC T . This Note argues that immigration courts have served and continue to serve as
important sites for the perpetuation of national identity myths. By focusing on a subset of cases
called "cancellation of removal," I examine the functional criteria by which immigrants are
granted exemption from deportation. Despite ostensibly neutral statutory standards,
immigration courts give legal sanction and shape to nostalgic, idealized, and exclusionary images
of American identity. I connect this modern trend to the historical role of immigration law in
constructing and amplifying narratives of identity and subordination- a pattern which has been
obscured in scholarship by an overemphasis on the civil rights achievements of mid-twentieth-
century immigration reforms.
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INTRODUCTION
In no other realm of our national life are we so hampered and stultified by the
dead hand of the past, as we are in this field of immigration.
- Harry S. Truman'
On May 4, 2001, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed an
immigration judge's decision to deny Javier Monreal-Aguinaga cancellation of
removal.2 The thirty-four year old Mexican national had entered the country at
the age of fourteen, married his wife, and was raising his three young U.S.
citizen children in Texas.' After government officials identified him and placed
him in deportation proceedings, Mr. Monreal-Aguinaga applied for relief from
deportation under the cancellation of removal provisions of the Immigration
and Naturalization Act.4 Although Mr. Monreal-Aguinaga successfully
demonstrated his good moral character and continuous physical presence in
the United States, the Board of Immigration Appeals denied his appeal on the
grounds that he had not proven that his legal permanent resident and U.S.
citizen relatives would suffer the requisite "hardship" if he were deported to his
native Mexico.5
In an impassioned dissent from the majority's holding, BIA member Lory
Diana Rosenberg painted a portrait of the Monreal-Aguinagas as a happy,
close-knit "American family," undeserving of the trauma of deportation and
separation that denying immigration relief would cause.6 Speculating on the
"extraordinary nature of the ties that the children [would] be forced to sever,"
Rosenberg insisted that her colleagues had failed to recognize something
essential about the family they were poised to disassemble: the family spoke
English, the children attended local schools, they maintained no ties to their
father's homeland.7 Indeed, the Monreal-Aguinaga children "very likely lit
sparklers on the Fourth of July, marched in the Columbus Day parade, and
cheered as loudly as any other American during the World Series."" The court's
1. Ctr. for Immigration Studies, Three Decades of Mass Immigration: The Legacy of the 1965
Immigration Act, Sept. 1995, http://www.cis.org/articles/995/back395.html.
a. In re Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56 (BIA 2001).
3. Id. at 57.
4. Immigration and Nationality Act S 24oA(b), 8 U.S.C. 5 1229b (2006).
s. Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 57-58.
6. Id. at7o.




holding, Rosenberg insisted, "completely ignores the fact that these children
are Americans."9
The argument and the family portrait that accompanies it are clear: this
family, on the brink of deportation, should be spared because it is an American
family. Whatever condemnation is due undocumented immigrants and
whatever fate the law imposes upon them as a consequence of their illegality,
the Monreal-Aguinagas should be exempt-at least in part because of their
Columbus Day marching and World Series cheering.
Rosenberg's voice is a dissenting one, of course, but her reasoning sheds
light on the broader way in which American identity is articulated, performed,
and evaluated in immigration courts. Contemporary legal guides and pro se
manuals for immigrants in deportation proceedings consistently instruct them
to demonstrate that they own their homes, attend church, and volunteer in
their communities.1 Appellate briefs describe applicants for cancellation of
removal as hard working, dutiful, pious, faithful, and unwaveringly committed
to their nuclear families.11 Indeed, decisions issued by the BIA and courts of
appeals overwhelmingly reflect the same values. When granting relief from
deportation, judges heap praise upon immigrants for working seven days a
week and marrying their high school sweethearts. Court decisions wax poetic
about immigrants who attend church every Sunday, coach local little league
teams, and raise their children speaking English.12 These values and lifestyles
are understood to be quintessentially American, and it is by proving one's
American credentials that one may be exempted from imminent deportation.
By granting and denying inclusion into the American polity on this basis, the
legal process rewards immigrants who express their conformity to narrow and
nostalgia-tinged ideas about what it means to be American. In so doing, the
law perpetuates myths about the nature of America and American identity.
By looking at the historical structures and functions of U.S. immigration
law, this Note sheds light on the way in which immigrants are called upon to
express their allegiance to traditional values, gender roles, and family structures
that are both implicitly and explicitly defined as "American." I argue that
immigration courts function as a forum for the production and performance of
American identity narratives and that this process of myth construction has
deep roots in American legal history. Although the structure and language of
American immigration and naturalization law have changed considerably since
g. Id. at 72 (emphasis added).
10. See infra notes 119-126 and accompanying text.
ii. See infra notes 127-135 and accompanying text.
l. See infra notes 136-149 and accompanying text.
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the early twentieth century when comprehensive national immigration policy
first emerged, the legal process governing immigration has long expressed and
fortified national identity myths. The subtle role that deportation laws play in
generating ideas of "Americanness" today is part of a broader and longer trend
in which immigration courts operate as tools for defining and policing the
nation's ideals.
Part I examines the emergence of comprehensive immigration laws and
argues that the early laws powerfully expressed romanticized notions of
American history and identity. The two main pillars of immigration law-
national origins quotas and racial prerequisites -articulated and enforced
images of an exaggeratedly homogenous and hierarchical nation. The quota
laws based immigration quotas on racial data from past decades -explicitly
aiming to maintain the racial composition of the past as it was imagined and
defined by census-takers and legislators. Racial prerequisite laws grounded
eligibility for citizenship in determinations of race. In so doing, these laws
created a public forum in which individuals could demonstrate their
conformity to white American values and ideals in order to "earn" their
citizenship. Together, by directly controlling the population and publicly
articulating national identity myths, these laws formed a framework through
which America's history and identity have been negotiated, expressed, and
substantiated.
Part II considers the legacy of those laws and the subtle ways in which
immigration law continues to perpetuate American identity narratives. The
revocation of quotas and prerequisites was intended to signify the end of
racialized and value-laden immigration laws. Proponents of the immigration
reforms of 1952 and, particularly, those of 1965 claimed that the new laws
would replace cultural hegemony and ethnocentrism with a veritable
celebration of diversity. This Part argues that the progress narrative advanced
in dominant scholarship overemphasizes the impact of mid-century
immigration reform. In spite of dramatic legal restructuring and the sweeping
claims of reformers, immigration courts continue to express and substantiate
hierarchical and exclusionary myths about American identity. As evidence, I
focus on immigrants who are on the brink of divesture from the polity and
explore the conditions under which they are relieved from deportation and
granted legal identity as Americans. Examining a subset of cases called
cancellation of removal claims, I argue that, although the statutes are less
explicit than those of the past, immigrants still must act out their conformity to
antiquated notions of America. Through complex proxies and ongoing
jurisdiction stripping, immigration law continues to actively produce and




The implications of this legal phenomenon span from individual to
cultural. At one level, the process stifles and coerces the immigrants who come
before the courts. It imposes upon vulnerable and legally marginalized
individuals the burden of performing a collective fantasy. Immigrants who
occupy the most precarious legal -and indeed physical - space are compelled to
act out the nation's imagined identity at the cost of communicating their own
motives, values, and identities. These legal processes constitute what Jerry
Mashaw has called an "insult[] to authenticity": they "falsify our experience,
and ... challenge our conceptions of ourselves as autonomous moral agents.""
The complex stories of historically underrepresented communities are reduced
into relative caricatures as they are inscribed into the public record.
The homogeneity of stories and voices presented in the immigration legal
forum furthermore raises concerns about the transparency and integrity of the
statutory law. Legal realists have long decried the failure of the law to candidly
articulate its criteria.14 This critique has particular salience with respect to
cancellation of removal, in which the narrow script that successful applicants
rehearse contrasts sharply with the broad and apparently neutral language of
the statute. Arguably, performances of a caricatured, 195os-style Americana
have come to substitute for the "good moral character" and "hardship"
requirements set forth in the doctrine. Pro se guides, court transcripts, and
appellate briefs reveal detailed criteria nowhere to be found in congressionally
authorized statutes or regulations. Rather than setting forth and abiding by
transparent criteria, the law operates through winks and nods.
Even still, this process does more than undermine the complexity of
individual identity or expose the inaccessibility, or even irrelevance, of the
statutory law. Importantly, the narratives articulated in immigration courts
represent and perpetuate real status hierarchies and patterns of social
subordination. Through changing terms and proxies, immigration law
continues to generate images of a polity that is markedly less diverse,
contested, and dynamic than its reality. The images produced and amplified in
the courtroom distort the diversity of American life and mischaracterize the
nation's dynamic and overlapping values and identities. They evoke directly
and through imagery a world of relatively entrenched power structures. The
America that immigrants are called upon to join -and indeed to construct in
the process of submitting to it-is one that generally rejects non-nuclear,
non-heterosexual families and lifestyles, largely confines wives and mothers to
13. Jerry L. Mashaw, Small Things Like Reasons Are Put in a Jar: Reason and Legitimacy in the
Administrative State, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 17, 30 (2001).
14. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12 (191o).
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kitchens, repudiates secularity, and bows to the hegemony of white middle-
class norms. The story is perpetuated through direct claims ("he married his
high school sweetheart," "she volunteers in church," "the kids speak English
better than Spanish") and also imagery. Calling upon immigrants to recount
stories about coaching little league and doing yard work for their elderly
neighbors may not be objectionable per se, but it evokes a social order and
value system in which power structures are presupposed. It harkens to an
exclusionary and whitewashed narrative that both denies and denigrates
diversity.
In that sense, the progress narrative-in which mid-century reforms
successfully democratized immigration law and rejected ethnocentrism -is not
only an incomplete historical account, but also obscures the continuing
complicity of contemporary immigration law in fortifying systems of
marginalization. To that end, Professors Reva Siegel's and Kenji Yoshino's
respective accounts of "preservation through transformation" are apt: although
civil rights reforms represent gains in some respects, they may also render
invisible and thereby justify the persistence of underlying status hierarchies."5
Changes in political and social rhetoric may indeed serve to protect underlying
status hierarchies and relationships of subordination. After all, Yoshino writes,
"[s]waddled in a progress narrative, the new policy becomes less available for
contestation. ",16 Accordingly, this Note looks beyond formal legal reform to the
lived experience and impact of immigration law over time-its cultural
implications and the threads of historical continuity which have persisted
despite, and perhaps because of, the changing legal forms and language.
I. EARLY COMPREHENSIVE IMMIGRATION LAWS: PREREQUISITES
AND QUOTAS
Although restrictions and regulations on immigration date back to a 1798
act authorizing the wartime deportation of "alien enemies,'1 7 the earliest
comprehensive immigration law was adopted in 1917. Before that point, U.S.
immigration law was a collection of exclusionary provisions intended to
prohibit the immigration and authorize the deportation of convicts, lunatics,
15. Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 1O5 YALE L.J. 2117
(1996) [hereinafter Siegel, The Rule of Love]; Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer
Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111 (1997)
[hereinafter Siegel, Equal Protection]; Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769 (2002).
16. Yoshino, supra note 15, at 833.
17. Act of July 6,1798, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 21-24 (20o6)).
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imbeciles, professional beggars, anarchists, polygamists, and "women coming
to the United States for immoral purposes," among others.' 8 Immigration laws
in the 188os notoriously prohibited the immigration of Chinese laborers, 9 but
the law provided no coherent framework to guide immigration policy.
By the first decade of the twentieth century, policymakers faced growing
pressure to respond to rising nativism and alarm about America's changing
racial and ethnic composition with broad, restrictive immigration laws. The
period following World War I had spawned a breed of nationalism that was
"distrustful of Europe, disillusioned with the aftermath of the war and the
failure of the Americanization program, . . . and disdainful of all things
foreign."2 At the same time, the Ku Klux Klan experienced a "phenomenal
rise" in membership,2' anti-Catholic and anti-Semitic sentiment grew
increasingly widespread, 2 and eugenics-based arguments about racial
superiority took hold in universities and think tanks.23 Consequently, calls for
greater and more targeted immigration restriction reached a fever pitch.
The Immigration Act of 1917 took broad strides to limit immigration,' but
in the context of intense and growing nationalism it simply did not go far
enough. The Act codified existing exclusion and deportation grounds," created
a "barred" zone to halt immigration from Asia, and imposed a literacy test for
new immigrants. Perceiving those controls to be insufficient, however,
congressional representatives almost immediately began to call for the
complete suspension of immigration.26 A series of bills in the sixty-sixth
18. H.R. REP. No. 82-1365, at 13-15 (1952) (enumerating the grounds of exclusion under acts
passed in 1891, 1903, and 1907).
19. Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882) (repealed 1943).
20. U.S. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION LAWS AND ISSUES: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 127
(Michael LeMay & Elliott Robert Barkan eds., 1999) [hereinafter U.S. IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION LAWS AND ISSUES].
21. See Rory McVeigh, Structural Incentives for Conservative Mobilization: Power Devaluation and
the Rise of the Ku Klux Klan, 1915-1925, 77 Soc. FORCES 1461, 1461 (1999); see also Michael
Lewis & Jacqueline Serbu, Kommemorating the Ku Klux Klan, 40 SoC. Q: 139, 144 (1999)
("At its peak in the early 1920S the new Klan had recruited between three and six million
members, roughly 8-io percent of the eligible population.").
22. Paul L. Murphy, Sources and Nature of Intolerance in the 1920s, 51 J. AM. HIST. 6o, 69 (1964).
23. See generally WENDY KLINE, BUILDING A BETTER RACE (2001) (tracing the emergence and
growth of eugenics in the United States); ALEXANDRA MINNA STERN, EUGENIC NATION 86-
92 (2005) (discussing the growth of scientific racism in the early twentieth century and its
impact on U.S. immigration policy).
24. Ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874 (repealed 1952).
2S. See H.R. REP. No. 82-1365, at 15 (1952).
26. See E.P. HUTCHINSON, CURRENT PROBLEMS OF IMMIGRATION POLICY 20 (1949).
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Congress proposed a total moratorium on immigration for periods ranging
from two to five years, and other bills called for an up to fifty-year freeze on
immigration from countries such as Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey.
27
It was in that context that the first quota law emerged.
A. National Origins Quotas: Defining the Future by Imagining the Past
Relative to its alternatives, the Emergency Quota Act of 192128 was seen as
moderate and passed with overwhelming congressional support.2 9 Like many
laws to follow, the Act admitted immigrants based on their national origins
and explicitly restricted immigration in order to maintain the racial
composition of past censuses. The law fixed annual quotas at three percent of
the foreign-born population in 191o. Three years later, the Immigration Act of
1924, or the Johnson-Reed Act, was passed in response to concern that the
Quota Act was too liberal and allowed for too great a departure from the
original complexion of the nation.3" Rather than basing quotas on the census of
191o, which reflected the presence of a substantial Southern and Eastern
European population, the Johnson-Reed Act based quotas on the 189o census
and scaled back the percentage from three percent to two percent.3"
27. E.P. HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIvE HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY, 1798-1965, at
171-76 (1981).
2S. Ch. 8, 42 Stat. 5 (amended 1924).
29. See HUTCHINSON, supra note 27, at 176-8o.
30. Ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153 (repealed 1952); see, e.g., MICHAEL E. PARRISH, ANxIOUS DECADES:
AMERICA IN PROSPERITY AND DEPRESSION, 1920-1941, at 113 (1992) (describing the Act as a
reflection of "new pessimism about assimilation and the resilience of the social order").
31. The two percent quota was intended to stay in effect until 1927. In fact, it remained in place
until 1929, when Congress approved the National Origins Plan. The shift from 189o to 191o
was intentional and had a profound impact on immigrant flows.
[S]ince 189o and prior to the quota legislation in 1924 the great majority were
members of the Mediterranean and Slavic races from Southern, Eastern and
Southeastern Europe. The great bulk of this "new" immigration has its sources in
Russia, Poland, Austria, Hungary, Greece, Turkey, Italy, and the Balkan
countries. It is this 'new' immigration which constitutes the immigration problem
of today.
RoY L. GARiS, IMMIGRATION RESTRICTION 204 (1927). "By using the census of 189o, 86 per
cent of the quota was allotted to the countries of northwestern Europe, leaving only 14 per
cent for all other quota countries." Helen F. Eckerson, Immigration and National Origins, 367
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 4, 7 (1966); see also Immigration: A New Deal, TIME, Oct.
8, 1923, at 4, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/o,9171,727532,oo.html
("The basing of quotas on the census of 189o instead of on the census of 191o will enlarge
1020
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Specific quotas and calculations changed over time, but the legal structure
remained constant. The racial and ethnic composition of immigrant flows was
designed to "mirror" a specific date in the nation's past. For example, the
National Origins Plan of 1929 set an annual ceiling of 15o,ooo immigrants and
provided that the quota for each nationality have "the same relation to 15o,ooo
as the number of inhabitants in the continental United States in 1920 having
that national origin had to the total number of inhabitants in the continental
United States in 1920. "32
Defense of the quota system took various forms and tones, but the
underlying use of the immigration system to maintain the America and
Americans of the past went largely unchallenged. To be certain, the quota laws
were proposed by eugenicists and proponents of Nordic superiority, who
believed that the "Nordic race" was "qualitatively superior" to all other races
and "represented the last refuge of human civilization and progress."33 These
theories "gave a presumably scientific validation to immigration restriction; for
how could a nation protect and improve its genes without keeping out
'degenerate breeding stock'?" 14 Likewise, radical political factions such as the
Ku Klux Klan warned that "[u] nless we safeguard ourselves against the further
influx of undesirables" with measures such as the quota laws, "there will no
longer be an America for Americans."3 They charged that "so-called
hyphenated Americans" represented a grave threat to the "decent, loyal,
patriotic, red-blooded, pure and unadulterated American citizen.,
6
Mainstream voices, however, also endorsed the goals of the quota system.
For the most part, the political debate focused not on whether immigration law
relatively the quotas from northern Europe, as compared to southern, because immigration
from the latter region has taken place mostly since 1890.").
32. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., IMMIGRATION LEGAL HISTORY: LEGISLATION FROM
1901-1940, at 3, http://www.uscis.gov/files/nativedocuments/Legislation%/2ofrom%/2o19o1
-194o.pdf (last visited Dec. 6, 2009).
33. Geoffrey G. Field, Nordic Racism, 38 J. HIST. IDEAS 523, 524, 526 (1977).
34. John Higham, American Immigration Policy in Historical Perspective, 21 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 213, 224 (1956).
35. The Regulation of Immigration-A Statement by the Grand Dragon of the Ku Klux Klan,
South Carolina (1924) [hereinafter Statement by the Grand Dragon], in PAPERS READ AT
THE MEETING OF GRAND DRAGONS, KNIGHTS OF THE Ku KLux KLAN 69 (1977), reprinted in
U.S. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION LAWS AND ISSUES, supra note 20, at 141, 142. The
Klan embraced the quota laws, but felt that they did not go far enough. "The present 3 per
cent admission law on the basis of the 191o census is the first attempt of Congress to restrict
immigration .... This law substantially checked the alien flood, but it has not given the
relief needed." Id. at 144.
36. Id. at 143.
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should strive to create a nation that would mimic its past, but rather how far
into the past it should reach. A 1950 report of the Senate Judiciary Committee
found that "[w]ithout giving credence to any theory of Nordic superiority, the
subcommittee believes that the adoption of the national origins formula was a
rational and logical method of numerically restricting immigration... to best
preserve the sociological and cultural balance in the population of the United
States." 7 In defense of quota laws, Colorado Representative William Vaile
argued on the floor of the U.S. Congress that "Congress might reasonably
say .... '[W]e prefer to base our quotas on groups whose value has been
established through several generations. We will therefore endeavor to
distribute immigration in proportion to the elements of our population as they
existed a generation ago."'"8 A 1952 congressional report defended the quota
system as "the best method" for controlling immigration because it "gives
every national group as many immigrants to this country as that national-
origins group has contributed to the population of the United States." 3 9
Although the tone of arguments in favor of quotas varied, the objective did
not. New immigrant groups were viewed as a threat. Southern and Eastern
Europeans in particular were not part of the racially and ethnically
homogenous America of the imagined past.40 Consequently, the public viewed
growing immigration from Italy, Germany, and Bulgaria as a threat to the
nation's character and values, and policymakers employed immigration law as
a tool to defend the "American" identity.
At one level, modeling immigration quotas on decades-old censuses reflects
nostalgia for the past and an effort to actively recreate it. Importantly, however,
the quota laws did not simply reflect longing for a time past, but rather for an
imagined and legally reconstituted time past. The Quota Act did not, in fact, aim
to replicate the actual 1920 census, but a highly revised version of the 1920
census. As historian Mae Ngai has aptly observed, the Act explicitly excluded
37. S. REP. No. 81-1515, at 442-45 (1950).
38. U.S. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION LAWS AND ISSUES, supra note 20, at 146-47
(quoting Rep. William N. Vaile in April 1924).
39. OTIS L. GRAHAM, JR., UNGUARDED GATES 52 (2004) (quoting the Senate Judiciary
Committee).
40. Between 1821 and 188o, Northern and Western Europeans constituted eighty-six percent of
the immigrants to the United States. Southern and Eastern Europeans represented
approximately three percent. Between 1881 and 1930, immigration from Southern and
Eastern Europe surged. During that period, Southern and Eastern Europeans represented
forty-nine percent of the total immigration to the United States. Northern and Western
Europeans represented thirty-five percent. Jesse 0. McKee, Humanity on the Move, in
ETHNICITY IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA: A GEOGRAPHICAL APPRAISAL, 19, 28 (Jesse 0.




"nonwhite people residing in the United States in 1920 from the population
universe governing the quotas."4 In other words, national origins quotas were
based on the specific racial and national origins groups that Congress
recognized as having existed in 1920, not those that actually did. The Act held
that, for the purposes of quota determination, "inhabitants in continental
United States in 1920" did not include "(1) immigrants from the Western
Hemisphere or their descendants, (2) aliens ineligible to citizenship or their
descendants, (3) the descendants of slave immigrants, or (4) the descendants of
the American aborigines." 42 Ngai explains further:
The Qiuota Board used census race categories to make its calculations. It
subtracted from the total United States population all blacks and
mulattoes . . . . It also discounted all Chinese, Japanese, and South
Asians as persons 'ineligible to citizenship' .. . .Finally, it left out the
populations of Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and Alaska .... In other words, to
the extent that the 'inhabitants in continental United States in 1920'
constituted a legal representation of the American nation, the law
excised all nonwhite, non-European peoples from that vision, erasing
them from the American nationality.43
41. MAE M. NGAi, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA
26 (2004).
42. Mae M. Ngai, The Architecture of Race in American Immigration Law: A Reexamination of the
Immigration Act of 1924, 86 J. AM. HIST. 67, 72 (1999). According to the law, immigrants
"born in the Dominion of Canada, Newfoundland, the Republic of Mexico, the Republic of
Cuba, the Republic of Haiti, the Dominican Republic, the Canal Zone, or an independent
country of Central or South America" were considered "non-quota immigrants" and
therefore not subject to the numerical limitations of the national origins quotas. Act of May
26, 1924, ch. 190, § 4, 43 Stat. 153, 155 (repealed 1952). Although a full analysis of the
treatment of immigrants from the Americas exceeds the scope of this Note, Helen
Eckerson's 1966 article offers insight into their nonquota classification:
When the white population of 1920 was distributed on a national-origins basis,
the quota board found that 5.6 per cent of the 94 million white persons counted
in the 1920 Census had their national origins in the countries of the Western
Hemisphere. At the time the quotas were established, the volume of this
immigration was not such as to cause great concern. In fact, so few nationals from
countries of Central and South America had entered the United States prior to
1920 that placing these countries within the quota system ... might very well
have hampered the Good Neighbor policy with sister republics. Therefore, the
1924 Act exempted immigrants from independent countries of the Americas from
quota restrictions.
Eckerson, supra note 31, at io-ii.
43. Ngai, supra note 42, at 72.
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It is in that sense that quota laws reflect more than defense of the lived
past, but rather expression of a romanticized past-a nonexistent, glorified
historical moment. Were the census data of 1920 to truly dictate immigration
quotas, Ngai points out, African nations from which slaves originated "would
have received 9 percent of the total immigration quota, resulting in 13,000
fewer slots for the European nations." 44 Instead, politicians made bold
arguments about preserving the nation's ethnic composition and described the
quota system as "a mirror reflecting the United States"4 while simultaneously
and systematically ignoring the existence of large swaths of the population.
In the process of negotiating the national origins quotas, immigration law
constructed and, indeed, codified a historical fantasy. The legal redefinition of
the "population of 1920," through the overt deletion of people from the past,
became a powerful reality -both in terms of collective imagination and actual
population control. Immigration law, after all, not only provides a forum for
articulating visions of American identity, but also shapes the demographics of
the polity. In this regard, Michel Foucault's concept of biopolitics is apt.46 In
their examination of Lawrence v. Texas47 and its implications for the regulation
of sexuality and gender, Craig Willse and Dean Spade consider Foucault's
conceptions of discipline and biopolitics: "If discipline operates at the level of the
body of the individual subject, biopolitics operates at the level of the mass of
bodies or the population. Biopolitics is characterized by the production of a
population with overall 'characteristics of birth, death, production, illness, and
so on."'' 8 The distinction is critical: forms of societal regulation such as census
categories not only inhibit the expression of personal and cultural identities,
but also shape "the distribution of life chances across the population, the
collection of data about this distribution and the regulation of resources at this
general level."'49 To examine the impact of coercive immigration laws at the
44. Id.
45. GRAHAM, supra note 39, at 9o (quoting Senator Sam Ervin of North Carolina).
46. MICHEL FOUCAULT, SOCIETY MUST BE DEFENDED 243 (David Macey trans., Picador 2003)
(1997).
47. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
48. Craig Willse & Dean Spade, Freedom in a Regulatory State?: Lawrence, Marriage and
Biopolitics, II WIDENERL. REv. 309, 320 (2005).
49. Id. at 321. Professor David Eng has also explored the constitutive nature of the nation-state's
information gathering and classifying functions. "Nation-states... 'still track and manage
their own denizens through an official time line, effectively shaping the contours of a
meaningful life by registering some events like birth, marriages, and death, refusing to
record others . . . .'" David L. Eng with Judith Halberstam & Jose Esteban Mufioz,
Introduction: What's Queer About Queer Studies Now?, 23 Soc. TEXT 1, 4-5 (2005) (quoting
Elizabeth Freeman, Time Binds, or Erotohistiography, 23 Soc. TEXT 57, 58 (2005)).
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individual level without considering the way that their categories and
imperatives shape the population itself is to overlook one of the most powerful
dimensions of immigration law.
In racially reconstructing America, the quota laws simultaneously
reimagined the nation's political and civic identity. By erasing the very
existence of minorities, the law likewise minimized their claims to recognition
and entitlement. The legal distortion of the population bolstered arguments
about the dominance of "white America." Modeling the present on a fantastical
past served as a justification for the perpetuation of political, economic, and
social hierarchies.
The quota system and its incumbent political discourse provided an
opportunity not just to construct homogeneity, but also to reassert its
superiority. The public and political discussion surrounding national origins
quotas relied upon and glorified the language, logic, and assumptions of
eugenics and race-based social theories. Arguments about immigration quotas
linked the reproduction of the census to the preservation of fundamental and
cherished political ideals, social norms, and moral values. The nostalgia
animating the quota laws was not simply for the complexion of an America
past, but for the characteristics attributed to that racial composition.
"New" immigrants were not part of the nation's history and-
emphatically-did not deserve to be. The post-189o immigrants were a threat
precisely because they were "so different" from Americans "in character,
thought, and ideals."'5' A 1924 editorial in the Washington Post argued that new
immigrants were "stoutly resist[ant] to Americanism," and that their "ideas
and notions and languages and concepts and traits and characteristics and
tendencies of thought" represented a threat to America's very existence.
The logic underlying the quota system was therefore circular. The
ostensible purpose for restricting immigration was to honor the nation's
history and celebrate its social, civic, and cultural institutions. The law's
champions insisted that their primary concern was for maintaining "'similarity
so. Statement by the Grand Dragon, supra note 35, at 141. In this way, immigration laws
constructed and perpetuated "Americanism" through exclusion. To borrow Ian Haney
L6pez's incisive terminology, America and its people viewed themselves as "the superior
opposite" of all things non-American. IAN F. HANEY L6PEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL
CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 20 (loth anniversary ed. 2006) (emphasis omitted). In this way,
the quotas gave substance and force to America's imagined past and sanctioned the civic and
moral dimensions attributed to that historical construction.
51. Editorial, Speed Immigration Legislation, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 1924, at 6.
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of cultural background"' among Americans of the past, present, and future.5s
And yet the cultural background that restrictionists claimed to maintain was
itself invented through the process of "defending" it. To "honor" the past was
to obscure and redefine it.
Thus, champions of national origins quotas produced the very identities
and hierarchies they purported to defend. Yoshino describes this phenomenon
as the constative fallacy-"the misperception that actions are describing an
identity they are actually creating." 3 In other words, descriptive claims may
actually be constructive claims, producing in the articulation that which they
claim merely to recount.5 4 In light of this important insight, immigration law
warrants scrutiny as a powerful force creating, articulating, and perpetuating
the very realities it purports to regulate.
B. Racial Prerequisite Laws: Performing America
Racial prerequisite laws constituted the second pillar of immigration law in
the early 19oos. These laws, like the quota laws, regulated immigration
through racial categories designed to maintain the country's racial complexion
and identity (imagined or otherwise). Unlike quota laws, however, the
prerequisite laws provided a specific and public forum for the performance of
race and "American" virtue.
Racial prerequisite laws predate the quota laws and even the emergence of
comprehensive U.S. immigration policy. In 1790, the fledgling U.S. Congress
passed the Nationality Act, which granted eligibility for citizenship exclusively
to "free white person[s]."" The law was amended after the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 such that eligibility for citizenship was
extended to "aliens of African nativity and to persons of African descent.", 6 For
52. NGAI, supra note 41, at 237 (quoting ROBERT A. DUNNE, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY,
1924-1952, at 167 (1972)).
s3. Yoshino, supra note 15, at 9O1. In other words, "signs that appear to describe referents can at
times... create them." Id. at 870 (emphases added).
54. In a particularly thoughtful contemporary application of the constative fallacy, Dean Spade
has examined the impact of gender classification and documentation in the context of
expanded surveillance and growing political emphasis on identity verification regimes. Dean
Spade, Documenting Gender, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 731 (2008) ("[T]erms and categories used in
the classification of data gathered by the state do not merely collect information about pre-
existing types of things, but rather shape the world into those categories, often to the point
where those categories are taken for granted by most people and appear ahistorical and
apolitical.").
55. Ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103, 103 (1970).




eight decades following the Naturalization Act of 1870, the prerequisite laws
restricted citizenship to those individuals whom the law defined as white and
those whom the law defined as black. In the 1920s, the quota acts lent even
greater authority to the prerequisite laws by specifying that all aliens who were
"ineligible for citizenship" would be prohibited from immigration. In so doing,
the acts incorporated into immigration law the racial prerequisites for
naturalization that had been in effect for more than a century.
Consequently, in order to adjudicate naturalization claims and determine
eligibility for immigration, courts were charged with articulating the meanings,
applications, and boundaries of racial categories. Unlike quota laws, which left
little space for the contestation of national origins classifications," prerequisite
laws compelled individuals who wished to dispute their racial assignations to
publicly perform their identity claims. As such, the racial prerequisite cases
provide rich evidence of the way America came to be associated with particular
cultural and moral ideals through evidentiary hearings and judicial
deliberation.
In a body of cases now known as the Racial Prerequisite Cases, U.S. courts
deliberated extensively upon the definitions, applications, and contours of
racial identity. Between 1878 and 1952, fifty-two cases were reported in which
individuals appealed their denial of citizenship due to racial ineligibility.5
8
Petitioners from Japan, Mexico, the Philippines, and Syria, among other
places, turned to the courts to claim that they were "white persons" for the
purposes of naturalization. 9 The ensuing decisions, which have drawn
scholarly attention in recent years, demonstrate the courts' active role in
constructing racial identity.
Professor Ian Haney L6pez has argued powerfully that the Supreme
Court's adoption of a "common knowledge" test to determine "whiteness" in
the 1920s reflects society's active production of race through the exercise of
legal power.6 ° In White by Law, Haney L6pez focuses particularly on two
57. Importantly, Ngai notes that the national origins categories were not themselves natural or
objective, but rather the result of larger political and social processes of racialization
underway in early twentieth-century America. See, e.g., Ngai, supra note 42, at 73 ("Few, if
any, doubted the Census Bureau's categories of race were objective divisions of objective
reality .... Census data gave the quotas an imprimatur that was nearly unimpeachable...
[and] was invoked with remarkable authority...
58. HANEY LPEZ, supra note 50, at 35.
sq. Id. at 1, 35.
6o. Id. at 3-7.
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Supreme Court cases, Ozawa v. United States6' and United States v. Thind,62 in
which the Court rejected scientific theories of race in favor of "common
knowledge" tests.6, In Thind, for example, the Court dismissed the Indian-
born Hindu respondent's claim that he was "white" on the basis of scientific
evidence. Conceding that "[i] t may be true that the blond Scandinavian and
the brown Hindu have a common ancestor in the dim reaches of antiquity," the" 64Af
Court nonetheless rejected the contention that Thind was legally white. After
all, the Court noted, "the average man knows perfectly well that there are
unmistakable and profound differences between them today."6 , Thind declared
that "the words 'free white persons' are words of common speech, to be
interpreted in accordance with the understanding of the common man.,
66
Hence, race became conflated with its social interpretations and associations -
no more or less than what people perceived it to be.
As these cases negotiated the boundaries of race, so too did they explore
and express the dimensions of American identity and social relations. In the
context of racial prerequisites, evaluating "whiteness" became another way to
determine suitability for "Americanness. '' 6' The prerequisite laws, by design,
sought to exclude from citizenship and, later, immigration those races that
were inherently unfit to be American. In so doing, they cemented a social
structure in which whiteness was relatively interchangeable with social,
political, and moral superiority.
At their core, the prerequisite laws reified racial status hierarchies.
Becoming an American required one to be white, and being deemed legally
white required one to be educated, entitled, and socially superior. Indeed, the
cases focused on the trappings and status indicators of race. The briefs,
arguments, and opinions revolved primarily around character, behavior, social
class, and civic values, not skin color or ancestry.68 Naturalization claims were
61. 260 U.S. 178 (1922).
6z. 261 U.S. 204 (1923).
63. HANEY L6PEZ, supra note 50, at 56-77.
64. Thind, 261 U.S. at 209, 211.
65. Id. at 209.
66. Id. at 214.
67. Blacks, too, were eligible for citizenship at this time. However, in every prerequisite case on
record but one, the petitioner contended that he was white. HANEY L6PEZ, supra note 5o, at
35. As a result, Haney L6pez and subsequent scholars have focused largely on the legal
construction of whiteness.
68. John Tehranian has written cogently about the performative dimension of the racial
prerequisite cases: "[Wihiteness was determined through performance. . . . Successful




predicated on the supremacy of whiteness. In 1909, for example the court
remarked with respect to Bhicaji Balsara, an East Indian native, that "since the
applicant appears to be a gentleman of high character and exceptional
intelligence, such an order [granting citizenship] may be entered upon his
application.''
9
Obtaining citizenship on the basis of whiteness was, above all, a matter of
proving one's compliance with idealized notions of American "character,
integrity, [and] habits." 70 As such, a "dramaturgy" emerged from this line of
cases, in which participants professed and performed their "American"
credentials.7 In deliberating upon Japanese national Takao Ozawa's racial
eligibility for naturalization, for example, the Supreme Court noted
approvingly that he "had been nearly three years a student in the University of
California, had educated his children in American schools, his family had
attended American churches and he had maintained the use of the English
language in his home. '72 The traditional identity myths endured: church,
English, and American values.
Thus, the prerequisite laws produced and perpetuated legally powerful
stories about America and Americans. The laws provided a public forum for
imagining the American past and present; they created and amplified
narratives about who Americans were and who they were not. The laws and
their judicial application fortified status hierarchies by creating narratives about
whiteness that were inextricably bound with educational access, privilege, and
social acceptance. Once again, the legal stories are constitutive. The petitioners'
stories created and buttressed the white America they sought to join. Yoshino's
beliefs, class orientation, language, ability to intermarry, and a host of other traits that
had nothing to do with intrinsic racial grouping. Thus, a dramaturgy of whiteness
emerged .... " John Tehranian, Performing Whiteness: Naturalization Litigation and the
Construction of Racial Identity in America, lo9 YALE L.J. 817, 820-21 (2000). Similarly, Ariela
Gross has examined the way race was discussed, performed, and evaluated in trials in local
courts during the antebellum period. She argues that race was defined by "civic
performances." Whiteness was "not only something [the petitioners] were, it was something
they did." Ariela J. Gross, Litigating Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination in the
Nineteenth-Century South, io8 YALE L.J. lo9,162, 164 (1998).
6g. In re Balsara, 171 F. 294, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 19o9) (emphasis added).
70. United States v. Dolla, 177 F. 101, 102 (5th Cir. 191o).
. Tehranian, supra note 68, at 821. To be deemed American was to have survived exacting
legal scrutiny of one's "educational attainment, occupational dispersal, language choice,
residential location, and intercultural marriage." Id. at 823.
72. Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 189 (1922).
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constative fallacy takes shape. We see here, again, the "misperception that
actions are describing an identity they are actually creating.
73
II. ERA OF REFORM AND THE PERSISTENCE OF MYTHMAKING
A. "The Progress Narrative": Reform and the Immigration Acts of 1952 and
1965
Contemporary immigration law took shape in no small part through the
legislative reforms of 1952 and 1965. By the middle of the twentieth century,
the end of World War II and the onset of the Cold War drew increased
attention to immigration law and policy. Policymakers agreed that immigration
reform was in order, but differed widely about the substance of the new
immigration law. One faction viewed immigration policy primarily as a
diplomatic tool and argued for the cessation of national origins quotas and bars
to immigration from Asia in order to reflect America's increasingly complex
understanding of Asia and its role in foreign policy.74 Another faction framed
immigration policy in terms of national security, vehemently resisting changes
to the quota system and calling for greater restrictions and deportation
authority in order to defend against the infiltration of subversive elements
from abroad.
The resulting law, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952,
7 5
reflected these deep ideological divisions. The law eliminated race as a bar to
immigration, officially ending the period of racial prerequisites to citizenship,
but it maintained the quota system and affirmed the use of the 1920 census to
determine quotas.76 Although the law no longer barred Asians from
73. Yoshino, supra note 15, at 9oi; see also supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text (examining
Yoshino's concept of the constative fallacy as it applies to the constitutive nature of
immigration law).
74. See, e.g., CHERYL SHANKS, IMMIGRATION AND THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY,
189o-199o, at 171 (2001) ("The cold war's emphasis on hearts and minds magnified the
importance of symbolic politics."); Maxine S. Seller, Historical Perspectives on American
Immigration Policy: Case Studies and Current Implications, 45 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 137, 156
(1982) (discussing the impact of "Cold War concerns about world opinion" on the
immigration acts of 1952 and 1965).
75. Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
76. The law set quotas at one-sixth of one percent of each nationality's population in the United
States in 1920. Accordingly, approximately seventy percent of the available spots were
reserved for nationals of the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Germany. ALICIA J. CAMPI,




immigration or naturalization, it imposed an extremely low ceiling for natives
of the "Asian Pacific Triangle." Furthermore, the definition of "Asian" for the
purposes of the quota system was uniquely racialized: "An individual with one
or more Asian parent, born anywhere in the world and possessing the
citizenship of any nation, would be counted under the national quota of the
Asian nation of his or her ethnicity or against a generic quota for the 'Asian
Pacific Triangle."'77
In short, the law was fragmented, and policymakers diverged sharply on its
various provisions. So loudly did the public clamor for immigration reform,
however, that the bill passed through the contentious Congress over President
Truman's veto. For his part, Truman described the bill as "a mass of legislation
which would perpetuate injustices of long standing against many other nations
of the world. ' ' , 8 He called for the abolishment of the national quota system,
which "was false and unworthy in 1924" and "even worse now." 
7
It was not until thirteen years later that Congress dismantled the national
origins quota system that had characterized immigration law for more than
four decades. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 replaced the quota
system with a first come, first served system that gave preference to individuals
with special occupational skills and relatives of U.S. citizens and legal
permanent residents. 80 The Act, signed into law by President Lyndon Johnson,
set numerical limits on immigration from the Eastern Hemisphere,8' and, for
the first time, from Latin America and the Caribbean as well.82
In so doing, the 1965 law reinvented the basic structure by which
immigrants would be admitted to or denied access to the United States.
Admission to the United States would no longer be contingent on race or
RACE, QUOTAS, AND IDEOLOGY (2004), available at http://immigrationpolicy.pairsite.com/
sites/default/files/docs/Brief2l%20-%2oMcCarran-Walter.pdf.
7. Office of the Historian, U.S. Dep't of State, The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
(The McCarran-Walter Act), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/cwr/87719.htm (last
visited Dec. 6, 2009).
78. President Harry S. Truman, Veto of Bill To Revise the Laws Relating to Immigration,
Naturalization, and Nationality (June 25, 1952), available at http://trumanlibrary.org/
publicpapers/viewpapers.php?pid=2389.
79. Id.
8o. Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
81. See Ctr. for Immigration Studies, supra note i. The law also implemented an annual cap of
20,000 immigrants per country that applied exclusively to the Eastern Hemisphere. NGAI,
supra note 41, at 258.
82. For a more detailed discussion of the shifting policy toward immigrants from the Latin
America and the Caribbean, see NGM, supra note 41, at 5O-55; and SHANKS, supra note 74, at
176-78.
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national origin. Accordingly, the reforms were proclaimed as a major victory
against racism and xenophobia. The 1965 law was said to be heavily influenced
by the civil rights movement underway in the country. Scholars and politicians
have characterized the Act as one of the three "major civil rights reforms of the
mid-196os," alongside the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act
of 1965.83 Celebrating the law's passage, Democratic Representative Philip
Burton pronounced: "Just as we sought to eliminate discrimination in our land
through the Civil Rights Act, today we seek by phasing out the national origins
quota system to eliminate discrimination in immigration to this Nation
composed of the descendents of immigrants. 8 4 Commentators to this day
describe the Act's "[d]iversification of the immigrant stream [as] . . . a civil
rights triumph.",
8
The Act was seen as a renunciation of the ethnocentric immigration laws of
the past. Its champions called the new framework "noble" and
"revolutionary., 86 Senator Edward Kennedy heaped praise upon the new law,
writing that "[a] measure of greatness for any nation is its ability to recognize
past errors in judgment and its willingness to reform .... Scholars note that
the 1965 Act "has . . . been interpreted as a breakthrough for liberalism,
revolutionizing the way that the country thought of, and treated, potential
immigrants. 88
The claims were bold and sweeping; the Act was viewed as the endpoint in
a classic progress narrative. The Act's champions believed it would
fundamentally alter the way the United States approached foreignness. The
Act's sponsor, Senator Philip Hart, proclaimed, "A newcomer should not arrive
at our nation's door, hat in hand, apologizing for his parentage or
83. See, e.g., Hugh Davis Graham, Affirmative Action for Immigrants?: The Unintended
Consequences of Reform, in COLOR LINES 53, 66 (John David Skrentny ed., 2001); Edward M.
Kennedy, The Immigration Act of 1965, 367 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 137, 138
(1966) ("It [the Immigration Act of 1965] stands with legislation in other fields-civil
rights, poverty, education, and health-to reaffirm in the 196o's our nation's continuing
pursuit of justice, equality, and freedom."); Seller, supra note 74, at 156 (linking the Act with
"the civil rights movement's campaign against racism [and] the pluralistic views of John F.
Kennedy").
84. 89 CONG. REC. 21,783 (1965).
85. Gabriel J. Chin, The Civil Rights Revolution Comes to Immigration Law: A New Look at the
Immigration and NationalityAct of 1965, 75 N.C. L. REv. 273, 276 (1996).
86. Id. (quoting THEODORE H. WHITE, AMERICA IN SEARCH OF ITSELF: THE MAKING OF THE
PRESIDENT, 1956-1980, at 363 (1982)).
87. Kennedy, supra note 83, at 149.
88. SHANKS, supra note 74, at 182.
119:1o12 2010
CONSTRUCTING AMERICA
birthplace. '' 8' The new law, he rhapsodized, would abandon past practices and
assess immigrants "on the grounds of security and economic and scientific
benefit; on the principles of family unity and asylum to the homeless and the
oppressed."9"
B. Continuing Mythmaking: Linking the Past and the Present
To the extent that existing literature has considered the hierarchy-
maintaining and identity-generating role of immigration law -generally in the
context of the social construction of race -the analysis focuses largely on racial
prerequisites and presents the issues in the past tense. Although the reforms of
1952 and 1965 were indeed dramatic, scholars tend to treat the laws'
implementation as an endpoint in their critical analyses. As such, the
characterization of immigration reform as a civil rights victory has obscured the
recognition of the underlying themes and generative functions of American
immigration law.91
In spite of substantial procedural and substantive changes over time,
immigration law continues to generate legally and culturally powerful
narratives about American identity. The legal process surrounding
immigration still articulates a narrow and exclusionary vision of the nation's
values and character and exercises the coercive power to admit or exclude
immigrants based on their compliance with that vision. Indeed, immigration
courts around the country regularly deliberate upon and enforce national
identity myths - and, as I shall demonstrate, they do so with decreasing judicial
review and oversight. Although race has been stripped from the statute, the
process and the performances the statute generates are not race-neutral or
culture-neutral in the vision of the "good" family and the "good" citizen that
they both contemplate and demand. The highly normative legal processes of
sg. Kennedy, supra note 83, at 141 (quoting Senator Hart's statements to the Senate
Immigration Subcommittee on January 13, 1964).
90. Id.
91. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text. The tendency to celebrate the appearance of
progress without interrogating the continuation of injustice and inequality is the central
contribution of Siegel's "preservation-through-transformation" account. See generally Siegel,
The Rule of Love, supra note 15, at 218o ("[I]t is possible to modify the rules and reasons by
which the legal system distributes social goods so as to produce a new regime, formally
distinguishable from its predecessor, that will protect the privileges of heretofore dominant
groups .... "). Or, as articulated by Yoshino, "The old policy 'was as bad as it looked,' and
came under fire on that ground. The new policy accomplishes the same end under a much
more benign guise. Swaddled in a progress narrative, the new policy becomes less available
for contestation," Yoshino, supra note 15, at 833 (citation omitted).
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the past provide a lens into a subtle, but similar (if far less explicit) function of
immigration law today.
C. Cancellation of Removal: Exemption from Deportation
As evidence of the continuing construction of American identity myths, I
focus primarily on "cancellation of removal," one of few legal options available
to immigrants in deportation proceedings who do not qualify for a handful of
narrow legal categories such as political asylum or family-based adjustment of
status.92 Unlike many forms of relief that are available to all immigrants
seeking to gain permanent legal status, cancellation of removal is exclusively
defensive. That is, only immigrants whom the government has already placed
in deportation proceedings are eligible to apply. By definition, cancellation of
removal is an avenue through which the law pardons some immigrants from
deportation and denies that exemption to others.
To be certain, other forms of relief exist for immigrants in deportation
proceedings. Some qualify for asylum or for relief under the Convention
Against Torture; others seek waivers of specific grounds of inadmissibility.93
However, cancellation of removal is something of a last resort-widely
available as a matter of statutory eligibility, but rather sparingly granted.
Furthermore, the process takes place out loud and publicly in immigration
courts. As such, it yields compelling evidence of some of the circumstances
under which individuals are relieved from deportation and granted permanent
recognition by the state.
Statutory requirements govern basic eligibility for cancellation of removal,
but the determination primarily hinges upon judicial determinations about an
immigrant's "good moral character" and the "hardship" that would be visited
upon his or her U.S. citizen or legal permanent resident spouse, parents, or
children ("qualifying relatives") if the immigrant were deported.94 These
92. Pursuant to legal changes enacted in 1997, "deportation proceedings" are now known as
"removal proceedings." See, e.g., United States v. Pantin, 155 F.3d 91, 92 (2d Cir. 1998)
("The IIRIRA made a number of significant changes to the immigration laws. One of these
did away with the previous legal distinction among deportation, removal, and exclusion
proceedings."). This Note, however, uses the common-knowledge term "deportation" to
describe both removal and exclusion.
93- INA § 212, 8 U.S.C. S 1182 (2006) enumerates the grounds of inadmissibility and provides
limited options for immigration officials to waive some of those grounds. See generally
DAVID WEISSBRODT & LAURA DANIELSON, IMMIGRATION LAw AND PROCEDURE IN A
NUTSHELL § 8-1 (5th ed. 2005).




determinations are discretionary, and the trend over the last several decades
has been to increasingly shield discretionary decisions by immigration judges
(IJs) and the BIA from judicial review. As a result, courts have latitude to insert
normative views and construe the language of the law so as to incorporate
unarticulated, implicit standards and expectations.
Unlike immigrants applying affirmatively for status in the United States,
individuals applying for cancellation of removal have necessarily broken the
law; some have violated the terms of their admission and face expulsion, and
others have been identified as unlawfully present. The immigration court
becomes a forum in which immigrants repent for their transgression of the law
and seek redemption by performing their conformity with "American" values,
lifestyles, and social norms. Much as national origins quotas harkened to an
imaginary American history and racial prerequisites demanded that individuals
perform their compliance with "white" norms, cancellation of removal hearings
perpetuate and enforce idealized and subordinating notions of American values
and identities. "Hardship" and "good moral character," though facially neutral,
have been used as proxies to determine whether an immigrant is worthy of
relief from deportation. In so doing, courts conduct a highly intrusive inquiry
into the immigrant's "Americanness" -thereby reflecting not only the
particular content of a powerful national identity myth, but also a source of its
reification and active perpetuation.
i. "Administrative Grace" and Shrinking Appellate Jurisdiction
Cancellation of removal traces back to the nation's early immigration laws.
Although the language of the law and standards for judicial review have shifted
over time, cancellation has always been a highly discretionary form of relief,
open to a wide range of judicial interpretations and applications. Furthermore,
cancellation of removal grows increasingly relevant as avenues for admission
and regularization of status narrow or close entirely.9"
The earliest incarnation of cancellation of removal was enacted as part of
the Immigration Act of 1917, which enumerated extensive grounds for
deporting non-nationals and simultaneously authorized the courts to "make a
recommendation to the Secretary of Labor that [certain] alien[s] shall not be
deported in pursuance of this Act .. . . The law did not set forth specific
95. See, e.g., Rob Paral, No Way in: U.S. Immigration Policy Leaves Few Legal Options for Mexican
Workers, IMMIGR. POL'Y Focus, July 20o5, at 1.
96. Pub. L. No. 301, § 19, 39 Stat. 874, 890 (repealed 1952) (emphasis added).
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standards according to which courts were to base their recommendations, but
rather left the decision to the courts' broad discretion.
The INA of 1952 established the basic legal structure for "suspension of
deportation," as it was called until the mid-199os. The law authorized the
Attorney General to "suspend deportation and adjust the status" of immigrants
who faced deportation on a wide range of grounds, including failure to comply
with entry and exit requirements, mental and physical disease, criminal
history, subversive political activities, and drug addiction. 97 Eligibility for this
form of discretionary immigration relief required non-nationals to demonstrate
continuous physical presence in the United States, good moral character, and
that their deportation would result in hardship to themselves or their
qualifying relatives.
98
For more than four decades, that framework governed the primary options
for immigrants in deportation proceedings. Undocumented immigrants could
seek relief under suspension of deportation, and legal permanent residents who
had been placed in deportation proceedings could apply for a related form of
relief under INA section 212(c). The statute explicitly enumerated the good
moral character and hardship requirements for suspension of deportation.99
The statutory language of section 212(c) was silent with respect to hardship
and good moral character, but the judiciary incorporated both elements in
establishing standards for the favorable exercise of discretion.' 0
97. Pub. L. No. 414, § 244(a), 66 Stat. 163, 214-16.
98. Id. § 244(a)(1), 66 Stat. at 214.
99. The degree of hardship required to warrant suspension of deportation has shifted over time.
The INA of 1962 streamlined the suspension of deportation provisions set forth in the 1952
Act and clarified the basic statutory requirements under INA S 244. Pub. L. No. 87-885, 76
Star. 1247. The 1962 amendments created two distinct hardship standards, to be applied
depending on the grounds of deportation: "extreme hardship" to the alien or qualifying
relatives, on the one hand, and "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" to the alien or
qualifying relatives on the other. See In re Hwang, lo I. & N. Dec. 448 (BIA 1964)
(discussing the meaning and application of the extreme hardship standard as imposed by
the INA of 1962); see also infra note 1o6 (reviewing the hardship standards currently
governing cancellation of removal).
ioo. Specifically, the BIA held that an immigrant applying for 212(c) relief
bears the burden of demonstrating that his application merits favorable
consideration. . . . Favorable considerations have been found to include such
factors as family ties within the United States, residence of long duration in this
country . . . , evidence of hardship to the respondent and family if deportation
occurs, service in this country's Armed Forces, a history of employment, the
existence of property or business ties, evidence of value and service to the




Both forms of relief were discretionary from the outset. The 1952 statute
specified that the Attorney General "may, in his discretion," suspend
deportation proceedings against an immigrant.' Judicial interpretations of
both suspension and section 212(C) also emphasized the discretionary nature of
relief. As early as 1957, the Supreme Court held that "[s]uspension of
deportation is a matter of discretion and of administrative grace, not mere
eligibility; discretion must be exercised even though statutory prerequisites
have been met."10 2 The BIA granted IJs broad authority to construe the law:
"We realize, of course, the difficulty, if not impossibility, of defining any
standard in discretionary matters of this character .... o3
In recent years, the legal standards have changed dramatically, and judges
now possess even greater latitude in interpreting and applying the law of
cancellation of removal. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) °4 revamped the INA and redrew the
landscape for immigrants facing deportation. IIRIRA essentially discarded
both section 212(c) relief and suspension of deportation and, in their place,
authorized the Attorney General to "cancel" the "removal" proceedings against
non-nationals pursuant to section 24oA of the new INA.' Cancellation of
removal provisions are now more restrictive, available to a narrower category
of non-nationals, and impose more stringent hardship requirements than their
predecessors.'°6
evidence attesting to a respondent's good character (e.g., affidavits from family,
friends, and responsible community representatives).
In re Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581, 583-85 (BIA 1978).
loi. Pub. L. No. 414, § 244(a)(1) (emphasis added).
lo2. United States ex rel. Hintopoulos v. Shaughnessy, 353 U.S. 72, 77 (1957).
103. In re L., 3 I. & N. Dec. 767, 770 (BIA 1949). The Supreme Court affirmed the highly
discretionary nature of hardship determinations in a 1981 suspension case, INS v. Wang, 450
U.S. 139, 145 (1981), which affirmed the BIA's denial due to insufficient demonstration of
hardship.
104. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 11o Stat. 3009-546.
1oS. 8 U.S.C. S 122 9 b (2006).
io6. Cancellation of removal provisions are available to two categories of non-nationals facing
deportation: permanent residents and nonpermanent (or undocumented) residents. To be
eligible, nonpermanent residents must show ten years of physical presence in the United
States, good moral character, and that their removal "would result in exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship to" their qualifying relatives. Id. § 122 9 b(b)(i)(D). The
cancellation statute does not explicitly require that permanent residents demonstrate
hardship or good moral character, but both of those elements have been incorporated
through judicial interpretation. For example, echoing its construction of section 212(c), the
BIA held that evidence of good character and hardship is critical to the favorable exercise of
discretion for permanent residents. In re C.V.T., 22 I. & N. Dec. 7, 11 (BIA 1998); see also
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The twin pillars of hardship and good moral character have persisted, but
the 1996 laws dramatically limited judicial review of those determinations."'7
Until 1996, there were avenues for guidance and oversight by the courts of
appeals. Immigrants who were denied cancellation of removal before an IJ
could appeal to the BIA, which reviewed IJ decisions de novo. If the Board
affirmed the denial of cancellation, immigrants could then appeal to the courts
of appeals. The courts of appeals reviewed BIA decisions for abuse of discretion
and, in so doing, provided independent guidance on the meaning of the law
and its appropriate applications.
Individuals who are denied cancellation on discretionary grounds can no
longer appeal to the circuit courts, but rather only to the BIA, pursuant to
IIRIRA and the REAL ID Act, ,s which followed in 2005. This change is
particularly meaningful in light of recent regulatory changes that weaken the
extent of BIA review. "Streamlining regulations" enacted in 2002 allow a single
BIA member, rather than the traditional panel of three, to review
nonprecedential cases.' ° 9 The 2002 regulations also direct the BIA to employ a
Romero-Torres v. Ashcroft, 327 F.3d 887, 889 ( 9th Cir. 2003) ("Cancellation of removal,
like suspension of deportation before it, is based on statutory predicates that must first be
met; however, the ultimate decision whether to grant relief, regardless of eligibility, rests
with the Attorney General."). The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)
also winnowed away at suspension of deportation by disqualifying non-nationals who had
been convicted of aggravated felonies, controlled substance offenses, some firearms offenses,
and several other crimes. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 11o Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8, 15, 18, 21, 22, 28, 42, and 50 U.S.C.).
107. For a discussion of the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of IIRIRA, see Jeffrey S. Lubbers,
Closing the Courthouse to Immigrants, ADMIN. & REG. L. NEws, Winter 1999, at 1, available at
http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/news/volz4no2/immigration.html.
ioB. Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 303 (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B), which now states:
"Notwithstanding any other provision of law.., and regardless of whether the judgment,
decision, or action is made in removal proceedings, no court shall have jurisdiction to review (i)
any judgment regarding the granting of relief under section 1182(h), 1182(i), 122 9 b, 1229c, or
255 of this tide, or (ii) any other decision or action of the Attorney General or the Secretary
of Homeland Security the authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in the
discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security ...." (emphasis
added)).
iog. Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms To Improve Case Management, 67 Fed.
Reg. 54,878 (Aug. 26, 2002); see also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET: BOARD OF
IMMIGRATION APPEALS: FINAL RULE (2002), available at http://www.justice.gov/
eoir/press/o2/BlARulefactsheet.pdf (describing the circumstances under which the three-
member BIA review can be circumvented). These streamlining regulations were designed to
"address extensive backlogs and lengthy delays" at the BIA level, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
FACT SHEET: BIA STREAMLINING (2004), available at http://65.36.162.162/files/
BIAStreamlining.pdf, but have been widely criticized, see, e.g., Pamela A. MacLean,




less rigorous "clearly erroneous" standard to review factual determinations by
immigration judges, rather than undertaking a full de novo review."' Subject
to regulatory criteria, the Board can also affirm an IJ decision without
explanation. This process, called affirmance without opinion (AWO), is
increasingly common."' AWO may take place even if a BIA member disagrees
with the IJ's holding but believes the error was without prejudice." 2 In total,
"approximately 93 percent of appeals are decided by only a single Board
member.""3
The effect of these laws has been to further insulate judicial constructions
of hardship and good moral character and to create an even more protected
sphere in which these concepts are performed and evaluated. 14 As far back as
1925, scholars argued that the discretionary nature of suspension of deportation
judge describing the BIA as "neutered by streamlining" and quoting a former BIA member
characterizing BIA review as a "rubber stamp" of IJ decisions). A 2004 decision by the Third
Circuit, for example, accused the BIA of "shirk[ing] its role and duty of ensuring that the
final agency determination in an immigration case is reasonably sound" and argued that
"the regulations are... subject to misuse and even abuse." Berishaj v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 314,
331 (3 d Cir. 2004).
11o. For a more extensive analysis of BIA standards of review, see Board of Immigration
Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 54,878 (Aug. 26,
2002) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. Pt. 3). The historical trajectory of cancellation of removal is
toward less and less guidance and oversight by the courts of appeals and increasingly
restricted options for immigrants who wish to appeal discretionary determinations. See, e.g.,
De La Vega v. Gonzales, 436 F. 3d 141, 144 (2d Cir. 2006) ("[W]e join five sister circuits that
have concluded that (the statute] deprives courts of the power to review discretionary
determinations concerning cancellation of removal.").
111. MARY KENNEY, How To CHALLENGE AN AFFIRMANCE WITHOUT OPINION BY A BIA MEMBER
2 (2002), http://www.legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/files/lacpaiOO102.pdf ("Even
before the new regulations were issued, the Board had accelerated its use of the AWO
procedure .... Thousands of these decisions have already been issued in all types of cases
... .[The American Immigration Law Foundation's] informal study of last summer's
decisions indicates that half of the decisions issues by the Board were AWO decisions; this
means that there may have been over ioo AWO decisions on any given day.").
112. See ist Circuit Overturns BIA "Affirmance Without Opinion," IMMIGRANTS' RTs. UPDATE
(Nat'l Immigration Law Ctr., L.A., Cal.), Dec. 18, 2003, http://www.nilc.org/
immlawpolicy/removpsds/removpsds133.htm.
113. PETERJ. LEVINSON, THE DEMISE OF COLLECTIVE DECISION-MAKING IN IMMIGRATION APPEALS
2 (2005), available at http://www.allacademic.con//meta/pmla apa research citation/o/4/
2/o/6/pages42o64/p42o64-1.php.
114. With respect to good moral character determination, the court similarly lacks jurisdiction to
review BIA determinations. See, e.g., Lopez-Castellanos v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 848, 854 (9 th
Cir. 2006). The courts of appeals generally do retain the limited jurisdiction to review
whether or not an applicant is statutorily precluded from establishing good moral character.
See, e.g., Moran v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3 d 1o89, o91 (9 th Cit. 2005).
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"thr[ew] the adjudication of particular cases into the hands of administrative
tribunals, with broad powers checked only by very limited judicial
supervision."115 Since 2005, when the REAL ID Act dramatically expanded
immigration judges' discretionary authority, the law all but bars immigrants
from obtaining review of discretionary determinations about hardship and
good moral character in cancellation cases." 6 Whereas courts of appeals still
actively review other aspects of immigration law and its application, the BIA
has the last word on all discretionary matters related to cancellation of removal.
Cancellation of removal is a fascinating subject of examination precisely
because the starting point for all proceedings is that the applicant is
deportable." 7 He or she has transgressed the law and, as such, has no
entitlement to relief from deportation. To the contrary, cancellation of removal
is explicitly a matter of "administrative grace." ' Very few procedures or
safeguards exist to ensure that relief is granted consistently or with reference to
specific, enumerated criteria. In the absence of clear guidelines, this Section
seeks to uncover and examine the circumstances under which -and gauges by
which -courts choose to exercise their discretion and relieve immigrants from
imminent deportation.
2. Cancellation of Removal in Action
a. Pro Se Materials
Among the most revealing ways to explore the unstated requirements and
implications of cancellation of removal is to examine manuals, brochures, and
leaflets designed to guide immigrants through the process. These materials
represent the efforts of lawyers, advocates, and social service organizations to
distill statutory requirements and vague language about discretionary
determinations into clear guidelines and practical suggestions for immigrants
seeking relief from deportation. As such, the simplicity of the language and
directness of the advice set forth in these pro se materials provide an unusually
115. Current Legislation: Outstanding Features of the Immigration Act of1924, 25 COLUM. L. REV. 90,
94(1925)-
116. For a more detailed review of the jurisdiction-stripping effects of REAL ID, see MARY
KENNEY, FEDERAL COURT JURISDICTION OVER DISCRETIONARY DECISIONS AFTER REAL ID:
MANDAMUS, OTHER AFFIRMATIVE SUITS AND PETITIONS FOR REVIEW, AMERICAN
IMMIGRATION LAw FOUNDATION (20o6), http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?docid
=17559.
117. Kalaw v. INS, 133 F.3d 1147, 1152 (gth Cir. 1997).




frank description of the gauges by which applicants for cancellation of removal
are evaluated.
Standard "Do It Yourself' cancellation guides and manuals include
checklists for immigrants preparing their cases. Immigrants are encouraged to
demonstrate that they obey the law conscientiously, work long hours, earn a
living, live in monogamous relationships, and raise studious, principled, law-
abiding children. The manuals remind immigrants to compile and submit their
pay stubs and housing deeds.'19 They urge applicants to gather proof of their
English language studies, records of their vocational training, and copies of
their "Certificates of Achievement."' 20
In addition to demonstrating their fiscal responsibility and unwavering
respect for the law, immigrants are encouraged to reflect broadly upon their
moral character, religious practices, and personal relationships. One manual
instructs cancellation applicants to consider: "What kind of ties do I have to
my community?" 121 More specifically, "What groups do I belong to?"; "Are
there friends or neighbors that I have helped out?"; "Do I attend religious
services in my community?"; and "How else have I participated in my
community?"' 2 A manual from the Florence Immigrant and Refugee Rights
Project calls upon immigrants to collect "[1] etters from religious organizations
I belong to" and "[lletters showing participation in my community," such as
"any help that [I] have given to neighbors, such as yard work, rides, etc.""2 3
The statutory language underlying cancellation of removal is spare, but the
manuals do not mince words: "Specifically, if you belong to a church, we
recommend that you become active in the church. Someday if you need to apply for
cancellation of removal, it would help if the pastor could testify for you. Also,
9ig. Florence Immigrant & Refugee Rights Project, Inc., Cancellation of Removal
Document Checklist (Apr. 7, 2003), http://www.firrp.org/publications/prose/erV
LPRCdocumentchecklistEN.doc [hereinafter Cancellation of Removal Checklist]; Florence
Immigrant & Refugee Rights Project, Inc., Cancellation of Removal for Non-Permanent
Residents: How Can I Prove That I Meet the Requirements for Cancellation of Removal?
(Apr. 7, 2003), http://www.firrp.org/publications/prose/en/ioYearDocumentationEN.doc
[hereinafter Requirements for Cancellation of Removal].
120. Cancellation of Removal Checklist, supra note 119.
121. Florence Immigrant & Refugee Rights Project, Inc., Cancellation of Removal:
Thinking About My Case (Apr. 6, 2003), http://www.firrp.org/publications/prose/enV
LPRCmycaseEN.doc [hereinafter Thinking About My Case].
122. Id.
123. Cancellation of Removal Checklist, supra note i1q.
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we recommend that you join community or cultural organizations."'"
Generally, the practice manuals do not suffer for lack of detail: "You need to
show that you and your family are valuable and productive members of the
community in which you live."' 2' The measures of "value" and "productivity"
are supplied: "For example, if you or your family members are active in a
religious organization, if any of you do volunteer work or if you are active in a
sports team in your community, you should get proof of this and present it to
the judge." 26
b. Appellate Briefs
Whereas pro se materials are framed in terms of tips and checklists,
appellate briefs weave together names, narratives, and life stories.1 27 These
briefs, written by advocates in order to dispute IJ denials of cancellation of
removal, frequently seize upon the same gauges and criteria to make their
cases. But rather than simply listing the importance of tax-paying, church-
going, property-owning, and baseball-coaching, the briefs craft coherent
biographies of "worthy" applicants.
Again and again, the briefs offer up aspiring Americans who are
industrious, family oriented, and community minded. A BIA brief on behalf of
Gelasio and Analilia DeGarcia, Mexican nationals applying for cancellation of
removal after eighteen years of residence in the United States, provides a case
in point. Gelasio, the brief emphasizes, "dutifully pa[ys] his taxes. " "' Analilia
"volunteer[s] at her local church, at Headstart, and her children's school."' 2 9
The couple lead a "model lifestyle," and their children "are taught entirely in
English, which is their best language ....,13
12.4. IND. LEGAL SERVS. INC., OBTAINING LEGAL RESIDENCE THROUGH CANCELLATION
OF REMOVAL (2002), available at http://www.indianajustice.org/Data/DocumentLibrary/
Documents/1o 5 3371359 .71/OlO5cancellation%200f/o2oremoval.pdf (emphasis added).
125. Requirements for Cancellation of Removal, supra note 119.
126. Id.
127. My intention in this Note is not to gauge the precise occurrence of this discourse, but rather
to call attention to a prevalent undertone in cancellation of removal proceedings. Although
my Note does not make quantitative claims, it is based on analysis of decisions from both
the Executive Office of Immigration Review (issued by IJs) and the BIA. The cases I
examine arise from various IJs and distinct regions of the country, and the immigrants in
proceedings are from various nations of origin.
128. Brief of Petitioner at 3, De Garcia v. Gonzales, No. 07-71182 (qth Cir. Dec. 20, 2007).
129. Id.




A brief on behalf of a married couple from Mexico, Efren Perez Mendez and
Sara Lidia Gutierrez, evokes similarly traditional images of the family: "Ms.
Gutierrez volunteers in her children's schools and church children's education
programs, and over the years has been awarded certificates of appreciation
from both. Mr. Perez works as a carpenter. He has paid taxes every year since
1990. He and his wife have strong social ties with the community of Hayward,
where the family has lived ever since they came to the United States."'31
The briefs are replete with gendered language, and they praise traditional
nuclear families unabashedly. Mr. Emisael Loya married "his childhood
sweetheart, Rachel Loya," with whom he has "a newly born baby."1 32 Mr.
Duran Jurado is the "primary provider for his family," and has been married
"to his high school sweetheart, a native-born U.S. citizen," and the mother of
their three U.S. citizen children "for nearly 12 years."'33 Mr. Rodriguez, "a
hardworking father," juggles two jobs, which "bring him happiness" because
they provide for his family's "health and well being."'34
Indeed, appellate briefs on behalf of the government often seize on the
same criteria. Arguing against the grant of cancellation of removal to Fernando
Arturo Martinez-Galvan, a government brief does not mince words in its
censure: Martinez-Galvan "is an unmarried father of a seven-year old son,
Arturo, and as of August 2005, was expecting another child with his girlfriend,
Rachel." The brief continues with thinly veiled scorn: "Martinez could not
remember his son's birthday 'exactly."
' 35
c. Judicial Decisions
Judicial actors such as IJs and the BIA are no less explicit in these normative
assessments. Granting cancellation of removal to Bing Chih Kao and Mei Tsui
Lin, husband and wife from Taiwan, the Board depicted the family as model
Americans: pious, hard working, industrious, and deferential to American
ways. The Board noted approvingly that the respondents own their home,
"obey[] the laws of the United States," and raise their children primarily
131. Petitioners' Consolidated Opening Brief at 7, Mendez v. Gonzales, 291 F. App'x 13 (9th Cir.
2008) (No. 05-70412), 2007 WL 2801201.
132. In re Ramirez-Medrano, No. A9o 793537, 2007 WL 926773 (BIA Feb. 6, 2007).
133. Brief for Petitioner Jesus Javier Duran Jurado at 6, 7, Duran-Jurado v. Keisler, 25o F. App'x
213 (9 th Cit. 2007) (No. o6-73258), 20o6 WL 3888467.
134. Opening Brief at 38, 40, Rodriguez v. Mukasey, No. 07-71727 ( 9th Cir. Nov. 14, 2007), 2007
WL 4589753-
135. Brief for Respondent at 5, Martinez-Galvan v. Mukasey, 329 F. App'x 171 (9th Cit. 2009)
(No. 07-71814), 2007 WL 4807111.
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speaking English.' 36 Mr. Kao "works 7 days a week and attends church on
Sundays."' 37 Ms. Lin "volunteer[s] at Thanksgiving to cook for the
homeless."' s The children "have clearly been integrated into the American
lifestyle."' 3 9
The decisions exalt individuals who own their homes, work long hours,
and pay taxes dutifully. "[T]he Immigration Judge noted the respondent's
steady employment history, that he and his wife purchased a house in 2005,
and that he volunteered as the coach of his son's baseball team.' 140 Mr. Kao
and Ms. Lin "own their house in Texas, which they bought in 1992."
14 1
Asencion Rubio Jacobo is the "sole financial provider" for his family, the BIA
noted approvingly, and "has been employed consistently since becoming a
lawful permanent resident and paid taxes.'
42
By the same token, courts rebuke those who depart from the profile of the
dutiful American. Overturning an IJ's decision to grant cancellation of removal
to Philippines national Clef Ramos Pacheco, the Board noted that "the record
is devoid of any evidence that the respondent owns any real property."' 43
136. In re Kao, 23 I. & N. Dec. 45, 49 (BIA 2001).
137. Id. at 48.
138. Id. at 47.
139. Id. at 51 (emphasis added). This Note does not claim that "American credentials" are
determinative of the grant or denial of cancellation. Statutory requirements and precedential
rulings do constrain judges. For example, in the case of Lina Lopez-Morales, the IJ stated on
the record that "this is the kind of case that I certainly would grant if I had the authority to
grant it. Ms. Lopez has a nice family. She's fully employed. She pays taxes. She attends
religious services with her family." Petitioner's Opening Brief at 26, Lopez-Morales v.
Gonzales, 229 F. App'x 576 (9 th Cir. 2007) (No. o6-72504), 2006 WL 3901473. However,
the IJ had "'a lot of problems distinguishing the factual pattern . . .' [from the] Board
precedent decisions which govern the non-LPR cancellation inquiry." Id. Even still, the
judge's criteria-"nice family," "full[]" employment, attendance at religious services-
advance this Note's central contention. After all, law is not just powerful with respect to the
outcomes it produces, but also the stories it tells and the iconography it perpetuates. See,
e.g., Muneer I. Ahmad, Resisting Guantanamo: Rights at the Brink of Dehumanization, 103 Nw.
U. L. REV. 1683 (2009) (exploring the legal genesis and underpinnings of the post-
September ii terrorist narrative, which Ahmad terms the "iconography of terror").
140. In re Valverde-Magallanes, A34 692 247, 2006 WL 3088869 (BIA Sept. 29, 2006). Similar
language can be found in appellate briefs. See, e.g., Petitioners' Opening Brief at 6, Valente
v. Ashcroft, No. 04-74956 (9 th Cir. June 13, 2005), 2005 WL 2703780 ("Petitioners were
gainfully employed and pay their taxes regularly. Petitioners own a home and automobile.
They have worked productively in this country.").
141. Kao, 23 1. & N. Dec. at 47.
142. In re Jacobo, A92 727 874, 2007 WL 1430774 (BIA Apr. 17, 2007).




Furthermore, the respondent had not "performed any service to the
community, except where he has been ordered to perform such service.'"
144
Considering Luis Felipe Cervantes-Gonzalez's application for cancellation of
removal, the Board chastised the Mexican national for pursuing his
unsuccessful music career instead of a more "lucrative" alternative: "Although
the respondent is a musician in a band, he provided no evidence to prove that it
had experienced success such that deportation would cause him to relinquish a
lucrative career .... ,"' The decisions are highly normative; IJs are empowered
to classify a broad range of conduct and qualities as demonstrative of "bad
character or undesirability as a permanent resident of this country. ' n46
In some cases, the language is even starker. The dissent in a 2002 BIA
decision contested the majority's denial of cancellation of removal because
"[t] his respondent and her family exhibit many of the values that we, as a society,
purport to value." Specifically, it continues, "[t]hey are hardworking, law-
abiding people with strong family values. They pay taxes, are active in their
schools and churches, own their own homes, and do not depend on public
assistance." 47 A brief on behalf of Emisael and Rachel Loya echoes this appeal:
"Petitioners were all persons of good moral character, who exemplifTy] family
values, strong religious faith, high regard for law and government, and a
generous, kind, giving nature. Such hope and promise humbly lived out in
furtherance of this nation's highest ideals should not now conclude in
deportation."148
The notion that immigrants bear the burden of embodying the American
identity myth is all but explicit. The stories that emerge from briefs and
decisions to grant cancellation of removal echo broader cultural themes. They
reflect an idealized, mythologized image of American values and American
families. Fathers coach children's baseball leagues ; 149 mothers volunteer in
144. Id.; see also In re Ramirez-Medrano, No. A9o 793537, 2007 WL 926773 (BIA Feb. 6, 2007)
("[T]he respondent's failure to pay income tax, particularly in light of her family's use of
public services is significant.").
145. In re Cervantes-Gonzalez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 560, 568 (BIA 1999).
146. In re Lopez-Romero, No. A36 902 778, 2007 WL 1430692 (BIA Apr. 19, 2007).
147. In re Andazola-Rivas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 319, 334 n.3 (BIA 2002) (Osuna, Bd. Member,
dissenting) (emphasis added).
148. Petitioner's Opening Brief, supra note 140, at 25 (emphasis added).
149. See, e.g., In re Valencia-Rodriguez, No. A34 642 164, 2008 WL 762679 (BIA Mar. 3, 2008);
In re Valverde-Magallanes, No. A34 692 247, 2006 WL 3o88869 (BIA Sept. 29, 2006); cf
Urzua-Covarrubias v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 742, 749 (9 th Cir. 2007) (Pregerson, J., dissenting)
(praising a father for coaching a soccer team); Brief for Petitioner Jesus Javier Duran Jurado,
supra note 133, at 6 (noting that Mr. Jurado coaches flag football).
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schools; families speak English, attend church together, and celebrate
American holidays. The portraits are a virtual ode to the type of traditional,
nuclear family values and structures famously celebrated in 1950s Americana.
3. Nostalgia and Reinvention
That the law both creates and reflects broader cultural narratives is not
itself novel. Scholars have long noted the capacity of the law to craft powerful
stories and influence the way individuals communicate, perceive, and value
their own identities. '5 ' That immigrants seeking entry to the country would
mold their behavior to the contours of the law, then, is not surprising.
Rather, it is the content of the performance that demands attention. One
might expect this uniformity of performance if the statute itself dictated that
women volunteer in church, men work two jobs and coach Little League, and
children speak English. But, to the contrary, the text of the law is strikingly
vague; the performances described above are interpretations of "good moral
character" and "hardship." The law carves out space in which judges have
broad discretion, and elaborate performances take shape within that space.
a. Nostalgia for a Time Past
The portraits of immigrants painted through the cancellation of removal
process echo familiar narratives of 195os Americana and "traditional American
values." Indeed, contemporary political and popular culture is replete with
romanticized images of times past. In her study of the American "nostalgia
trap, '151 Professor Stephanie Coontz has theorized that "[o]ur most powerful
visions of traditional families derive from images that are still delivered to our
1so. Indeed, I have previously written about the complex impact of labor and immigration laws
on the subjective experiences, relationships, and identities of undocumented immigrant
women. Margot Mendelson, The Legal Production of Identities: A Narrative Analysis of
Conversations with Battered Undocumented Women, 19 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 138, 149
(2004) (considering how "'undocumented' identities have been created and conferred
through specific laws and how political and social discourses have filtered into the daily
realities of these immigrants' lives"). Professor Robert Gordon has written eloquently on the
subject: "[T]he power exerted by a legal regime consists less in the force that it can bring to
bear against violators of its rules than in its capacity to persuade people that the world
described in its images and categories is the only attainable world in which a sane person
would want to live." Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REv. 57, 109
(1984).





homes in countless reruns of 1950s television sit-corns."'' 2 These images, and
the normative values they reflect, have become fixtures in our national
consciousness.S3
This identity narrative focuses heavily on family values, gender roles, and
religious faith -what Professor David Eng has described as the "idealization of
the heteropatriarchal family unit."'-4 Professor Wendy Brown describes
America's identity myth as inherently conservative, recurring to "an imagined
idyllic, unfettered, and uncorrupted historical moment (implicitly located
around 1955) when life was good-housing was affordable, [and] men
supported families on single incomes.' ss Likewise, Professor Karen Pyke
describes the "Normal American Family," which is "pervasive in the dominant
culture" and "glorified in the popular culture, as in television shows like ...
Leave It to Beaver, The Brady Bunch, Family Ties, and The Cosby Show.' 6 The
images, she observes, "serve as powerful symbols of the 'normal' family or the
'good' parent."17
According to this account, the "true American" family was "a restricted,
exclusive nuclear unit in which women and children were divorced from the
world of work.' ' 8 Men were "protectors,"" 9 characterized by "'ambitio[n],
"authority,"' 6 ' and "independen[ce] .''62 Women, whose identity was largely
subsumed by motherhood, were "the moral guardians of civilization itself.'
63
In the "successful 1950s family," the wife "was expected to subordinate her
152. Id. at 23.
153. See STEPHANIE CooNTz, THE WAY WE NEVER WERE: AMERIcAN FAMILIES AND THE
NOSTALGIA TRAP 1-2 (1992) ("On both a personal and a social level, when things are going
well, we credit our successful adherence to the family ideal, forgetting the conflicts,
ambivalences, and departures from the 'norm.' When things are going poorly, we look for
the 'dysfunctional' elements of our family life, blaming our problems on 'abnormal'
experiences or innovations.").
154. Eng, supra note 49, at 9.
155. WENDY BROWN, STATES OF INJURY 61 (1995).
156. Karen Pyke, "The Normal American Family" as an Interpretive Structure of Family Life Among
Grown Children of Korean and Vietnamese Immigrants, 62 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 240, 240-41
(2000).
157. Id. at 241.
158. COONTZ, supra note 151, at 13.
159. Id. at 43.
16o. Id. at 42 (citation omitted).
161. Id. at 43.
162. Id. at 64.
163. Id. at 43.
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own needs and aspirations to those of both her husband and her children" 
6,
and "seek fulfillment in motherhood. " '6 The enduring image of the American
family "glorifies and presents as normative that family headed by a
breadwinning husband with a wife who, even if she works for pay, is devoted




As a unit, families were expected above all to be self-sufficient. Indeed, "the
self-reliant family was the standard social unit of ... society."16 7 In that sense,
the markers of independence and financial success assumed value of their own.
Purchasing a home was not merely a financial endeavor, but rather a moral act.
As Coontz explains, owning a house made one "more honorable and honest
and pure.,i
6 8
These traditional conceptions of the family play out vividly in cancellation
of removal proceedings. The nostalgic characterizations of America could well
be drawn from the pages of Mr. Duran Jurado's brief or the Board's opinion in
the case of Mr. Kao and Ms. Lin. Indeed, men are depicted as hard-working-
laboring long hours, even juggling two jobs. 69 Women are repeatedly and
explicitly associated with service and volunteer work.170  They receive
disproportionate praise for helping out in the church, volunteering at their
children's schools, and serving food to the homeless. Many women applying
for cancellation have paying jobs, of course, but the briefs and opinions take
pains to preserve the association with selfless service to the home, church, and
community. Thus, women, even when not completely sheltered from the
professional world, continue to be linked with notions of purity, piety, and
domesticity.
Likewise, the conviction that "the healthiest families 'stand on their own
two feet"' permeates cancellation of removal proceedings. 171 Pro se checklists
remind immigrants to show that they file taxes, pay their utility bills on time,
164. Id. at 36.
165. Id. at 32.
166. Pyke, supra note 156, at 241.
167. COONTZ, supra note 151, at 69.
168. Id. at lo9 (citation omitted).
169. See, e.g., Urzua-Covarrubias v. Gonzales, 487 F.3 d 742, 749-50 (9th Cir. 2007) (Pregerson,
J., dissenting); In re Valverde-Magallanes, No. A34 692 247, 2006 WL 3088869 (BIA Sept.
29, 2006); In re Kao, 23 I. & N. Dec. 45, 49 (BIA 2001); Petitioners' Consolidated Opening
Brief, supra note 131; Opening Brief, supra note 134, at 35-36; Brief for Petitioner Jesus Javier
Duran Jurado, supra note 133.
170. See, e.g., In re Ramirez-Medrano, A9o 793 537, 2007 WL 926773 (BIA Feb. 6, 2007); Kao, 23
I. & N. Dec. at 49; Petitioners' Consolidated Opening Brief, supra note 131.




and secure health insurance for their families.172 To own real estate is a great
virtue, and immigrants are encouraged to include copies of housing deeds
along with their vital documents submitted to court. Again and again, judges
remark approvingly about home ownership.
173
In that sense, immigrants seeking relief through cancellation of removal
become super-Americans in the mold of the 1950S sitcom family, embodying
cherished memories of "suburban ranch houses and family barbecues."174 Their
testimony revalorizes Thanksgiving and appeals to our collective fondness for
little league. It resurrects "the model of the white heterobiological nuclear
family as the standard against which all social orderings must be measured."'s
b. Reinventing History
Importantly, nostalgia is not merely yearning for the past, but rather
yearning for an imagined past. "Nostalgia (from nostos-return home, and
algia- longing) is a longing for a home that no longer exists or has never existed.
Nostalgia is a sentiment of loss and displacement, but it is also a romance with
one's own fantasy." 176 Indeed, this is the distinctive nature of the world to
which applicants for cancellation of removal are expected to aspire. It reflects a
persistent, even stubborn, romance with a myth of America.
That America is not presently a nation of married, churchgoing parents
raising English-speaking children in split-level homes is uncontroversial. The
number of single mothers in the United States tripled between 197o and 1995
and remained constant through 2oo2.'77 According to USA Today, the United
States has the lowest percentage among Western nations of children who grow
172. Cancellation of Removal Checklist, supra note 119; Requirements for Cancellation of
Removal, supra note 119.
173. See, e.g., Urzua-Covarrubias, 487 F.3 d at 749 (Pregerson, J., dissenting); In re Ramos
Pacheco, No. A43 000 312, 2007 WL 4182352 (BIA Oct. 19, 2007); In re Jacobo, No. A92 727
874, 2007 WL 1430774 (BIA Apr. 17, 2007); Valverde-Magallanes, 2006 WL 3088869; Kao, 23
I. & N. Dec. at 5o; Petitioners' Opening Brief, supra note 140, at 6.
174. COONTZ, supra note 151, at 31. Bonnie Honig has described the stylization of immigrants as
"supercitizen[s]." BONNIE HONIG, DEMOCRACY AND THE FOREIGNER 78 (2001).
175. David L. Eng, Transnational Adoption and Queer Diasporas, in LovE's RETURN:
PSYCHOANALYTIc ESSAYS ON CHILDHOOD, TEACHING, AND LEARNING 113, 137 (Gail M. Boldt
& Paula M. Salvio eds., 2006).
176. SVETLANA BOYM, THE FUTURE OF NOSTALGIA, at xiii (2001) (emphasis added).
17. JEFFREY ScoTT TURNER, FAMILIES IN AMERICA 64 (2002).
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up with both biological parents.' 78 Fewer couples marry in the first place: "The
number of couples who live together without marrying has increased tenfold
since 196o... [and] the marriage rate has dropped by nearly 30% in [the] past
25 years .... ,,79 Far from being sheltered from professional life, women today
constitute forty-six percent of the total labor force."' As to the churchgoing
myth, only twenty-six percent of Americans attend religious services weekly.s1
And, according to the Associated Press, "[n]early one in five U.S. residents
speaks a language other than English at home ....
As Coontz and others have demonstrated, these images do not merely
stand at odds with the nation we know today. Rather, they never captured the
reality of American life-instead representing a collective fantasy to
which these nostalgic images refer. "[M]any of our 'memories' of traditional
family life . . . [are] myths," Coontz writes. 8 "The actual complexity of our
history... gets buried under the weight of an idealized image." 84 The myth is
enduring: in spite of "ever mounting evidence that families of the past were not
as idyllic.., as they are often portrayed .... our changing family experiences
and trends" continue to be filtered through "the distorted lens of historical
mythologizing about past family life. 
8s
But to view these narratives as solely inaccurate would be to overlook the
powerful inequalities and patterns of subordination that they perpetuate and
reflect. Insofar as the images reflect anyone's reality, it is largely the reality of a
wealthy, suburban, native-born, heterosexual, nuclear family. These icons
represent a projection of "white middle-class experience into universal 'trends'
178. Sharon Jayson, Divorce Declining, but So Is Marriage, USA TODAY, July 18, 2005, at 3A,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2oo5-o7-18-cohabit-divorcex.htm.
179. Divorce Rate Drops to Lowest Since 197o, USA TODAY, May 11, 2007,
http ://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-o5-11-divorce-declineN.htm.
18o. U.S. Dep't of Labor Women's Bureau, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.dol.gov/
wb/faq38.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2009). Fifty-nine percent of women in the United States
participate in the labor force. Id.
181. F. Gillum, Frequency of Attendance at Religious Services and Mortality from Multiple Causes in a
U.S. National Cohort, 7 INTERNET J. FAM. PRAc. (2009), http://www.ispub.com/journal
theintemet-journal of familypractice/volume_7_number._9/article/frequency-of
_attendance at religious-services-and mortality.from multiplejcauses-in a u s
_nationalcohort.html.
182. Non-English Speaking Households on Rise, ST. PETERSBURG TIMEs, Oct. 9, 2003, at i6A,
available at http://www.saintpetersburgtimes.con/2oo3lo/og/news-pf/WorldandnatioV
NonEnglish-speaking_.shtml.
183. COONTZ, supra note 153, at 2.
184. Id. at 1.




or 'facts. ' ' '86 The "America" they conjure is, arguably, premised on the
exclusion, even subordination, of those whose lives and values are not
represented in the myth.
4. Threads of Continuity: Myth Construction and Immigration Law
Once again, then, immigration law reaches back to the imagined and
exclusionary past. As demonstrated, this process of myth construction through
immigration law has deep roots. As the quota laws harkened back to an
imagined historical moment, so too does the cancellation process exalt a
narrow, backward-gazing, exclusionary idea of America's identity. Quota laws
modeled U.S. immigration on a nonexistent America of the past; cancellation
of removal calls upon immigrants to perform a collective projection of
America's lost virtue and values. Both legal frameworks adopt an incomplete
and idealized image of the nation's past as a gauge against which to evaluate
prospective immigrants. Furthermore, both the quota system and the
cancellation of removal process lend coercive force to the myth they adopt; the
capacity of an immigrant to embody the American myth determines, at least in
part, whether he or she becomes part of America.
Like the racial prerequisites, cancellation of removal establishes a public
forum through which courts assess individuals' compliance with broader
identity narratives and thereby articulate the contours of that identity. Racial
prerequisites defined and reified a "white" identity by excluding those who did
not conform to its strictures. In a similar, if more complex, manner,
cancellation of removal excludes from America those whose values and conduct
are not deemed sufficiently "American," thereby perpetuating the concept of an
essential Americanness.
Cancellation of removal laws, of course, do not explicitly adopt the past as a
standard to be maintained and reproduced. Immigration judges do not
evaluate Americanness directly, as courts assessed "whiteness" under the
prerequisite laws. Likewise, the cancellation statute does not explicitly call
upon judges to admit immigrants in order to maintain a specific moment in
U.S. history, as the quota laws did.
In fact, it is precisely for those reasons that cancellation of removal cases
warrant greater scrutiny. The process continues to take place, but it does so
under complex proxies and largely sheltered from judicial review. Whereas past
laws were more explicit about their objectives, the cancellation statute is
ostensibly neutral. It is, therefore, not available for public contestation or
186. CooNrz, supra note 153, at 6.
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democratic scrutiny. The process generates narratives and stories that are
culturally consequential, even legally binding, but it is largely hidden from
appraisal, dispute, and negotiation by the public or even the judicial
infrastructure.
Further exacerbating the invisibility of this process, the dominant discourse
around U.S. immigration history has drawn too stark a divide between
pre-1952 and post-1965 immigration law and policy by focusing narrowly on
legal process and statutory language. The Act of 1965 has been celebrated as
"radically new" for renouncing the ethnocentric, highly normative policies of
the past. 187 Its champions argue that the Act was a recognition of the country's
"past errors in judgment" and an indication of "its willingness to reform."'88
Supporters claimed not only that the law would modify the process of
immigration, but also that newcomers would no longer "arrive at our nation's
door, hat in hand, apologizing for [their] parentage or birthplace." 8 9 These
sweeping claims about tolerance and diversification, although perhaps accurate
as a matter of statutory analysis, stand at odds with the tales of cookie-baking
mothers and baseball-coaching fathers that emerge in virtual unanimity from
the cancellation of removal process. Although the statute may be neutral to
race, culture, and social values, its enforcement is anything but.
Understanding the full impact of the law, then, demands an approach that
recognizes the coercive power of the law and also its symbolic and narrative
power-both at the individual (disciplinary) and the broader societal
(biopolitical) level.1 90 Laws, here, must be conceptualized as "a complex
repertoire of discursive strategies and symbolic frameworks that structure
ongoing social intercourse and meaning-making activity among citizens." ' 9'
187. GRAHAM, supra note 39, at 93.
188. Kennedy, supra note 83, at 149.
189. Id. at 141 (quoting Senator Hart's statements to the Senate Immigration Subcommittee on
January 13, 1964).
19o. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.




Law both reflects the culture in which it is steeped192 and shapes that culture
through its application.1 93
Consequently, the stories told during cancellation of removal proceedings
reveal unspoken norms and also reinforce them. The legal discourse that
unfolds in immigration court not only determines the physical location of
immigrants' lives, but also the way their stories and experiences perpetuate,
embody, or resist broader narratives about the country and its people.
In the case of cancellation of removal, good moral character and hardship
frequently act as proxies for unspoken standards by which the nation evaluates
immigrants. Indeterminacy and vagueness in the statutory language, coupled
with jurisdiction-stripping and withering appellate review, permit a wide range
of culturally consequential performances to take place largely unacknowledged
within the legal sphere. Cancellation of removal cases not only reveal the
salience of traditional American iconography, but also account for some of its
perpetuation.
To that end, the narratives generated within the cancellation of removal
process must be located within a broader normative world. Ostensibly neutral
language assumes new meaning when considered in the context of historical
patterns of mythmaking in immigration law and competing ideals of national
identity.'94 Stories of home ownership and church attendance are more than
benign expressions of good moral character when understood as codes for
specific, contested representations of American identity.
192. Laws are "artifacts that reveal a culture, not just policies that shape the culture." Paul
Gewirtz, Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law, in LAW'S STORuES 2, 3 (Peter Brooks & Paul
Gewirtz eds., 1996); see also Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & SOc'Y REv. 869,
886 (1988) (describing law as "a species of social imagination" and "a hermeneutic project"
in which "the words are keys to understanding social institutions and cultural formulations
that surround them and give them meaning").
193. By the same token, laws do more than reflect norms; they instantiate them. See, e.g.,
CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY
215 (2000) ("(Laws] do not just regulate behavior, they construe it.").
194. Ahmad, supra note 139, at 11 ("To understand legal dispute, one must comprehend the
narrative contest it inhabits. And to understand legal victory, one must recognize the
triumph of one narrative vision over another."). In that sense, my approach has been
informed by the tradition of critical legal studies and critical race studies, which seek to
interrogate legal language and standards that are presented as neutral or objective. See, e.g.,
David Kairys, Introduction to THE POLITICS OF LAW 1, 14-15 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998)
("This is the great source of the law's power: It enforces, reflects, constitutes, and
legitimizes dominant social and power relations without a need for or the appearance of
control from outside and by means of social actors who largely believe in their own
neutrality ..
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CONCLUSION
To some extent, the perpetuation and reification of national identity
narratives through immigration may be inevitable. Homi Bhabha writes of the
nation's ongoing struggle to achieve coherence in spite of shifting
demographics, imperfect borders, and contested values. The history of the
nation, he writes, is constantly "in the process of being made," and
"foundational fictions" take on great value in the effort to incorporate "new
'people' in relation to the body politic."' g Nations struggle to "give
permanence and solidity to a transient political form" through invented
traditions.' 96 Likewise, Bonnie Honig writes incisively about America's
ambivalence towards foreigners -both the threat posed by their difference and
the opportunity they offer the nation to reinstall unanimity and "return. . . to
its first principles.' ' 97 Incorporating new individuals and communities, Honig
argues, presents both an occasion and an imperative for the nation to
rearticulate and fortify its imagined identity.1
98
The cancellation of removal process throws into sharp relief this tangled
relationship between immigration and national identity. The process can be
understood to possess a logic of its own-taking the shape, for example, of a
conversion ritual, in which the immigration court serves as a forum for
immigrants to proclaim new, "American" values and repudiate old, "foreign"
ones. The testimonials are individual, personal, and self-reflective. The rites
and roles are standardized. The judge, the lawyers, and the convert each play a
role in questioning, challenging, and officiating the conversion to
"Americanness." If the tropes, even the specific images and words, reappear
throughout different petitioners, and courtrooms, it is because they constitute
part of the ritual itself. Like any conversion ritual, the practice recognizes and
reinforces the distinct identity of the tradition being adopted.
In this sense, difference is both accentuated and neutered. Insofar as
difference - cultural, linguistic, material, and moral - is presented, it is
195. Homi K. Bhabha, Introduction: Narrating the Nation, in NATION AND NARRATION 1, 3-5
(Homi K. Bhabha ed., 1990).
196. Timothy Brennan, The National Longing for Form, in NATION AND NARRATION, supra note
195, at 44, 47.
197. HONIG, supra note 174, at 32, 74.
198. Foreignness can be "a device that gives shape to ... political communities by marking
negatively what 'we' are not." Id. at 3. The immigrant, Honig explains, chooses us. In so
doing, immigrants implicitly recognize our national coherence, our existence, and our claim
to superiority. Id. at 47-48; see also id. at 12 (exploring the question: "What problems does




rendered harmless as it enters the public record. As immigrants who are
outside the law come within its confines, they disclaim their difference, or at a
minimum, minimize and neutralize it. Here we see what Eng has observed in
the context of transnational adoption: the "production of . . . difference,
accompanied by a simultaneous reinscription- an effacing and a
whitewashing- of this difference."' 99
Likewise, and perhaps more cynically, the cancellation of removal process
can be seen as a way of placing immigrants on notice of the American identity
myth, if not demanding, or even expecting, their compliance. In this sense, the
process is undertaken with a wink; immigrants recite the familiar myth,
recognizing at some level that it is both false and essential. The stories and
testimonials do not communicate promises about future behavior, but rather
deference to the existence of the national mythology. The process serves, if not
to enforce American ideals, to ensure the salience of the narrative. By telling the
court that he works two jobs, then, Mr. Rodriguez is not necessarily
communicating that he intends to keep working two jobs or that he places
particular value on having two jobs, but rather that he understands America's
fondness for hard-working fathers who provide for their wives and children.
Irrespective of the appropriate metaphor, immigration rituals may play
such a significant role in the nation's sense of coherence and unity that it is
virtually impossible - and perhaps undesirable - to eradicate the normative and
identity-based dimensions of the legal process. As we have seen,
comprehensive U.S. immigration law has generated national identity narratives
since its very emergence.
Even still, the stark contrast between the complex reality of American life
and the tidy images, values, and lifestyles celebrated in the legal process
presents cause for concern. Whether church attendance is an appropriate proxy
for good moral character is, at least, a matter of divergent opinion. Likewise,
one wonders whether owning a home and marching in Columbus Day parades
are relevant considerations for determining the cancellation of an individual's
imminent deportation. The ubiquity of narrow, ethnocentric images of
Americana raises questions about whether the law calls for the appropriate
performances.
My intention is not to evaluate the specific criteria by which immigrants are
assessed, but rather to shed light upon them. Cancellation of removal decisions
unfold without meaningful judicial guidance or oversight with respect to
appropriate criteria or their applications. The statute itself is so vague as to
provide no external indication of the cultural performance taking place under
199. Eng, supra note 175, at 125.
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its authority. Precedent exists with respect to the exercise of discretion, but BIA
and judicial review are insufficient to ensure adherence to the precedent. IJ
decisions are not published; the public cannot access transcripts of
proceedings. Culturally consequential performances take place in relative black
holes of the judicial system.
To some extent, restoring appellate review would increase the regularity,
predictability, and public scrutiny over cancellation determinations. The
withering of BIA review has clearly contributed to the opacity of the
cancellation process. Rejecting recent BIA streamlining regulations, curbing
the practice of affirmance without opinion, and requiring the BIA to publish
more of its decisions would be affirmative steps toward greater transparency
and accessibility to the public.2"' Likewise, this analysis suggests that
jurisdiction-stripping statutes like the REAL ID Act and AEDPA, which restrict
appellate review of discretionary cancellation determinations,2 ' entail a
broader range of consequences than generally recognized. These measures have
been critiqued on many grounds, but generally with respect to their immediate
legal and doctrinal implications and outcomes. I have argued that jurisdiction
stripping has important cultural, narrative, and identity-based implications
that are frequently overlooked. Awareness of these implications should inform
our evaluation of laws that restrict appellate jurisdiction over immigration
proceedings.
These, of course, are intermediate steps intended to regularize cancellation
of removal somewhat, perhaps even to curtail the use of particularly
inappropriate or outdated proxies for good moral character. To view discretion
over cancellation of removal as a problem that must be solved, however, is to
overlook some of the most fundamental implications of these findings. Broad
judicial discretion over cancellation is not incidental to our immigration legal
structure, but rather symptomatic of its underlying limitations.
Judicial discretion to "pardon" immigrants can be likened to a steam valve
used to release pressure from the rest of the system. At its core, cancellation of
removal provisions reflect unease about U.S. immigration laws and the
zoo. See supra text accompanying notes 104-113.
201. See, e.g., Daniel Kanstroom, The Better Part of Valor: The REAL ID Act, Discretion, and the
"Rule" of Immigration Law, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 161, 162 (2006-2007) (noting that AEDPA
and IIRIRA "contained a severe limitation on judicial review" and that "[t]hese laws were,
in effect, an assertion that much of immigration law was outside the mainstream of the
United States rule of law"); Gerald L. Neuman, Jurisdiction and the Rule of Law After the 1996
Immigration Act, 113 HARv. L. REv. 1963 (2000); Gerald L. Neuman, On the Adequacy of
Direct Review After the REAL ID Aa of 2005, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 133 (20o6-2007); Stephen





consequences of fully enforcing them. Contemporary immigration laws
provide very few avenues for legal immigration or regularization of
immigration status. The INA offers little reprieve, even for individuals with
highly sympathetic biographies and circumstances. The present legal structure
allows judges to circumvent the law's rigid strictures, but only in exceptional
cases. The judge who chooses to exercise that discretion, then, bears the
burden of justifying the exception. Hence, the narrative of Americana enters as
a justification. Demonstrating that an immigrant is "American enough" may be
a way to assuage our collective anxiety about carving out exceptions in the first
place.
In sum, discretion functions as a double-edged sword-clearing a small
path through which some immigrants can gain status, but lining the way with
hypernormative vocabulary and imagery that both caricature the immigrant
and shape the broader culture. At the same time that discretion reflects longing
for greater humanity in the immigration process, it has also amplified a narrow
notion of our polity. Consequently, dramatically restricting discretion over
cancellation of removal or underestimating its centrality to the present legal
framework would be inadvisable without more extensive reform to relieve the
pressure on decisionmakers to craft these narratives of exception.
Above all, it is imperative to recognize the generative and constitutive role
of immigration law and the threads that link the present immigration law to
the past. These identity generative processes are more than superficial or
idiosyncratic relics of former policies and practices. Rather, this Note points to
a real and relevant trend taking place in immigration courts around the
country. Indeed, this recognition is particularly relevant and timely given the
surge of immigration cases following 9/1122 and the growing discourse around
immigration law and immigrant identity." 3 As the nation looks toward
202. See, e.g., Financial Services and General Government Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2oo9:
Hearings on H.R. 732 and S. 326o Before the Subcomm. on Financial Services and General
Government of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 1ioth Cong. 44 (2009) (statement of Hon.
Julia S. Gibbons, J., U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit; Chair, Comm. on the Budget of
the Judicial Conference) (noting the impact on federal courts of the recent "infusion of
resources" to immigration enforcement); Adam Liptak, Courts Criticize Judges' Handling of
Asylum Cases, N.Y. TviEs, Dec. 26, 2005, at Al ("Immigration cases... accounted for about
17 percent of all federal appeals cases last year, up from just 3 percent in 2001. In the courts
in New York and California, nearly 40 percent of federal appeals involved immigration
cases.").
203. See, e.g., Ahmad, supra note 139; R. Richard Banks, Racial Profiling and Antiterrorism Efforts,
89 CORNELL L. REV. 1201 (2004); Mae M. Ngai, Birthright Citizenship and the Alien Citizen,
75 FoRDI-itam L. REv. 2521 (2007); Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV.
1575 (2002).
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another round of immigration reform, 2°4 it is essential to break out of the
tendency to view immigration law exclusively doctrinally and to consider the
endurance of cultural myths and the complex and persistent role of
immigration law in shaping national self-perception.
2o4. See, e.g., Muzaffar Chishti & Claire Bergeron, Obama's Homeland Security Selection Viewed
as Focused on Immigration, MIGRATION POL'Y INST., Dec. 15, 2008,
http://www.migrationinformation.org/Usfocus/display.cfm?ID=715; Daphne Eviatar, New
Picks for DHS Raise Hopes for Immigration Reform, WASH. INDEP., Feb. 24, 2009,
http://washingtonindependent.con/31326/new-picks-for-dhs-raise-hopes-for-imnigration
-reform.
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